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This thesis examines how context in Derridean signature theory is taboo and 
underutilized, and calls signature theory to embrace the contaminating mark of context. 
Signature theory, as proposed by Jacques Derrida and Peggy Kamuf, offers a mere 
glimpse into Romanticism‟s strained relationship with the signature, with a close reading 
limited to Rousseau. This thesis widens the scope of existing signature scholarship, and 
expands the context of the signature by focusing on a variety of signatures, events and 
contexts to reveal that the slipperiness of the signature is a pervasive problem, irreducible 
to simply just Rousseau. This thesis does not involve a return to the origin, or a search for 
origins; Part I is a return to the period which Derridean signature theory investigates, in 
an attempt to interrogate Derrida, Kamuf, and the signature itself; expanding the concept 
of the signature through its various manifestations of handwork and linework, and 
weaving together a more complicated, contaminated, and ultimately convincing context 
for signature theory to begin (again) from. Part II forces signature theory to begin again 
by putting it into practice. Here, I take Kamuf to task for her failure to fully „contract‟ the 
signature. She completely ignores the physical dimension of the word „contract.‟ Going 
one step further than simply critiquing her signature practices, I „contract‟ the signature 
by having Derrida‟s signature tattooed on my body. The tattoo and its location comment 
on the current limitations of signature theory, and perhaps of academic practice generally; 
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this textile, is the text 
produced only in the 
transformation of 
another text. Nothing, 
neither among the 
elements nor within 
the system, is 
anywhere ever simply 
present of absent. 
There are only, 
everywhere, 
differences and traces 
of traces. 
 






Compulsive doodling and drawing – on notebooks, textbooks, desks, walls, bibles and 
bathroom stalls, toilet paper and shoe soles. Scrawling the names of favourite bands and 
classroom crushes – but, most importantly, and admittedly narcissistically, my own. My 
signature.  
 
Sign. Sign. Sign.  
 




Ultimately, I have always already been engaged with the signature, in practice first, in 
theory second. Signature theory, which grows specifically out of Jacques Derrida, 
continues to haunt my notebooks, and mark the terrain of my scholarship.  
 
What follows is a reversal in two parts; first, an engagement with the signature in theory, 




















CHAPTER 1: Signature Theory 
 
A signature is in effect a promise. It „says‟ “I am the person I say I am.” It is taken to be 
the truthful extension of oneself; the inky standing-in when the body cannot. As Derrida 
in “Signature Event Context” explains,  
By definition, a written signature implies the actual or empirical nonpresence of 
the signer. But, it will be said, it also marks and retains his having-been present in 
a past now, which will remain a future now, and therefore in a now in general, in 
the transcendental form of nowness […]. This general maintenance is somehow 
inscribed, stapled to present punctuality, always evident and always singular, in 
the form of the signature. Such is the enigmatic originality of every paraph. For 
the attachment to the source to occur, the absolute singularity of an event of the 
signature and of a form of the signature must be retained: the pure reproducibility 
of a pure event. (328) 
The signature also promises that whatever it is attached to, either paper or plastic, is its 
property, as in the sense of lawful; lawful name, lawful owner, lawful words. The 
signature is a writable and readable sign; a manifestation of a name. It is the proper name 
that is generally accepted as part of that which makes us individual; my name is different 
than yours, and hers, and his, etc., Derrida interrupts such classical thinking and notes 
that while your name is different it is also (necessarily) the same – you can share the 
same name with someone else; and in that sense it is repeatable, ergo, not singular nor 
individual; not your property at all. It is also not individual in the way a name needs to be 
recognizable as a name, or „readable‟ as Derrida says. Niall Lucy gives the great example 
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of Prince, when he changed his name to a symbol, “which no one could say at all” (104); 
and yet this symbol is still recognizable as a sign, a signature, as that which signals and 
symbolizes a specific artist. If it is recognizable, as it must be in order to function as a 
signature, it is part of a code. As Lucy notes, “the propriety of „one‟s own‟ proper name 
relies on being formed out of general signifying elements that are not one‟s own – 
elements that are improper. Impropriety is every proper name‟s condition of possibility” 
(104). We are familiar with impropriety in the sense of actions, of someone not knowing 
their boundaries (ie. going „outside‟ a marriage, „more than‟ friends, going „too far,‟ 
„crossing a line‟). It is this sense of impropriety, this non-property that describes the 
nature of the signature and its relation to the name. The non-ownership of impropriety 
also speaks to the larger form, “if it has one,” of deconstruction which, as Peggy Kamuf 
notes, consists of “pieces that are at once fragments of a totality that never was and parts 
of a whole that cannot cohere” (Signature Pieces 17). This description of deconstruction 
offers a fitting terministic screen of self-reflexivity through which to interrogate the 
border or boundary between the proper name and signature.  
 
Kamuf describes both the signature and the proper name: 
A signature is not a name; at most it is a piece of a name, its citation according to 
certain rules… As a piece of a proper name, the signature points, at one extremity, 
to a properly unnameable singularity; as a piece of language, the signature 
touches, at its other extremity, on the space of free substitution without proper 
reference. At the edge of the work, the dividing trait of the signature pulls in both 
directions at once: appropriating the text under the sign of the name, expropriating 
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the name into the play of the text. The undecidable trait of the signature must fall 
into the crack of the historicist/formalist opposition organizing most discourses 
about literature. (12-13) 
Kamuf‟s musings on Rousseau‟s troubled relation with his signature provides her with, as 
William Ray notes, “a paradigmatic case of the slipperiness of authorizing signature, 
authorial identity, and literary properties” (310).  
 
Following Derrida, Kamuf describes the trouble with Rousseau‟s attempt at regulating his 
literary identity and intentions. She notes that after Derrida, who has read Rousseau in 
light of the signature debacle, „Rousseau‟ the name is changed: “„Rousseau‟ is the name 
of a problem, the problem of the idealist exclusion of writing- of materiality, of 
exteriority – in the name of the subject‟s presence to itself” (24). Rousseau bears and 
becomes the mark, then; the first to attempt to authenticate the signature, to solidify who 
signs, by performing a self-reflexive analysis on “„himself‟ in somewhat the same way 
that Freud, the founder of another institution of self-reflection, had to perform his own 
analysis” (25). Kamuf identifies Rousseau‟s Confessions as the text that attempts to 
justify and authenticate a signature already circulating widely so that, at a certain 
point in its career (after the ban on Emile and the pursuit of the author), his 
signature is entirely concerned with countersigning what had already been signed. 
And it is this necessity of doubling itself that marks a certain turn in the history of 
signature […] Doubling itself, the signature „Rousseau‟ uncovers what must 
always divide it; it exposes the limit at which one signs – and signs again.  (25-6)  
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It is this initial documentation that leads Kamuf to credit Rousseau with the birth of the 
“narrativization of the signature” (26).  
 
Apart from the analysis of Rousseau, Kamuf cycles through how the various situations or 
signature contexts, such as the legal signature, function. While Kamuf notes that in the 
act of signing your signature becomes more than a name, it becomes a mark, she 
overlooks that this mark is also affixed to another mark; the signature is affixed both to a 
mark (sign at the „X‟, on the „dotted-line‟) and as a mark (unique to you and yet 
necessarily repeatable – the same, but different). 
 
Still, whereas other critics, such as Niall Lucy, are adamant about establishing the 
difference between the signature and proper name, Kamuf more fittingly focuses on the 
contexts wherein the aforementioned forms and functions blur:  
conventional understanding is loosened and we are allowed to see the signature 
operating on its own, so to speak, as a particular use of the proper name. Such 
occasions are written works (literature in the general sense) bearing an author‟s 
signature which also make bare its uncertain operation. (ix)  
Kamuf argues that “the modern study of literature has largely contrived to look away 
from this exposed condition of the signature,” and in doing so has disguised the signature 
in “various guises: psychological, historical, formal, ideological” which together 
constitute our pervasive conception and institution of authorship, “an institution that 
masks or recuperates the disruptive implications of literary signature” (ix-x). Kamuf 
positions the signature and proper name as transitory categories/forms with and in the 
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slipperiness of the phenomenon of authorship, a phenomenon and economy which is 
almost always presented in an antithetical way; stable, authoritative, singular.  
 
Kamuf‟s engagement with signature theory offers a glimpse into the eighteenth-century‟s 
“vexed relationship” with the signature, as Ray poignantly describes (310) it, but also, 
more generally, deconstruction‟s and postmodernism‟s obvious affinity for this slippery 
figure. However, as Derrida and Kamuf limit their examinations to a close reading of 
Rousseau, I feel there is a need to widen the scope of their signature investigations. It is 
from this “crack,” the place where Kamuf identifies signature theory has slipped, that I 
expand the eighteenth-century‟s vexed relationship with the signature, by focusing on a 
variety of actual signatures, events and (con)texts – from male and female writers, 
scientists, workers – to reveal that the slipperiness of the signature is a pervasive problem 
for the eighteenth-century, irreducible to simply just Rousseau. I argue that the 
Romantics are very much aware of and anxious about the slipperiness of the signature, 
and as such, this anxiety is manifested more generally in a variety of anxieties over other 
slippery lines. It is part of a larger problem over hand(i)work. Additionally, looking at the 
larger historical base of the Derridean focus on the signature, since it seems to be 
primarily grounded in a specific period, reveals the way technology affects the 
relationship between the hand and the line, increasing the anxiety. 
 
Ironically, the limitation of Derrida and Kamuf‟s examination and theorization of the 
signature is their lack of thoroughly scrutinizing the events and contexts in which the 




This thesis does not involve a return to the origin, or a search for origins; Part I is a return 
to the period which Derridean signature theory investigates, in attempt of interrogating 
Derrida, Kamuf, and the signature itself; expanding the concept of the signature through 
its various manifestations of handwork and linework, and weaving together a more 
complicated, contaminated, and ultimately convincing context for signature theory to 
begin (again) from. I force signature theory to begin again by putting it into practice.  
 
In Part II, I take Kamuf to task for her failure to fully „contract‟ the signature. She 
completely ignores the physical dimension of the word „contract.‟ Going one step further 
than simply critiquing her signature practices, I literally, physically „contract‟ the 
signature via tattooing Derrida‟s signature on my body. The tattoo and its location 
comment on the current limitations in signature theory, and perhaps of academic practice 
generally; of contracting without touching, and fearing contexts.   
 
What better way to ground something, or reinforce its visceral nature than by writing it 
on the genitals; a location that is always already contaminated, in part by being 
overwritten, marked by and a mark of difference – a metonym for wound, as either 
circumcision or genital mutilation; a fitting place both to write of the signature which is 
cut off from the signing body, and to cut the signature into the body. This is a writing of 




Anxieties over the line are far more manifest than Derrida or Kamuf admit; the threat of 
the line, its dangerous uncontrollability is revealed in the period in many text/ual/ile 
ways. As such, we can see the signature as metaphorically standing in for the fleshy 
human in so far as its own slippery position is analogous to the human weaver‟s slippery 
position in relation to the line and the machine (frame – framing technologies). This 
study offers a more fleshed out rationale behind choosing the Romantic period as the 
starting place for signature theory – adding more complexity and cuntaminates, more 
surface and depth, to the existing model of the signature. 
 
Our investiture in the line (either thread or ink) is accelerated by the implementation of 
technologies that threaten to take power over the line, reflected in the rhetoric of those 
dealing with the line, the line emanating from the hand, as a kind of madness. The 
anxiety occurs over the shifting focus from line work to frame work. The relationship 
between these two textual/textile economies in the eighteenth century is often 
characterized/met by anxiety and unruliness – for example, the weaver and ruler 
relationship that Kamuf cites. The anxiety over the line manifests itself in violent 
outbreaks by the Luddites, in off-limits sexuality in Jane Taylor, in the framing of 
monstrosity in Mary Shelley, and in the cheeky figures and signatures of William Blake.   
 
In the twentieth century another seismic shift occurs between line work and framework. 
However, rather than being met with violence, this shift towards the framework is met 
with anti-aesthetic tendencies. I examine Shelley Jackson‟s Patchwork Girl as an example 
of this ugliness.  
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Where the signature can be a source of anxiety, if you attempt to control it, it can also be 
a source for postmodern play, if you let it loose – as is often manifest in variations of 
patchwriting, playgiarism, and here, in a thesis which crosses the line, in an act that will 






















CHAPTER 2: Kamuf‟s (selective) Blindness  
 
Kamuf‟s third chapter in Signature Pieces, titled “Contracting the Signature,” again 
addresses Rousseau, although this time for his authorial voice in Of the Social Contract. 
Here, Kamuf cross-examines the etymology of Rousseau‟s title, and traces the sense of 
„contract‟ to “the semantic field of tractum, the tuft of wool drawn first into a thread 
before being twisted with other threads […] and drawn through the warp” (43). While 
Kamuf astutely connects interlocking (fabric) with interlocuting, suggesting that 
“[w]eaving is a metaphor for ruling, which is a metaphor for writing, which is a 
metaphor…,” this “double art” is also a double-standard (45). Kamuf‟s figure of the 
“weaver/ruler” finds its contradiction, if not a double-contradiction, within itself; 
particularly as it is placed within the context of Rousseau‟s time, wherein the weaver 
figure could hardly be equated with a ruler figure.  
 
The weaver/ruler is a contradiction given the situation of weavers during the Romantic 
era, which is the very same time period/framework Kamuf uses to contextualize the 
weaver/ruler. Rather than rulers, whom we might loosely characterize as public figures 
with particular power and the status of nobility, weavers were marginal figures, the most 
famous of which were Luddites, and carried with them the status of notoriety rather than 
nobility.  
 
The parliamentary speeches of the time capture particularly well the oppositional rather 
than complementary relationship between the weavers (Luddites) and rulers (Tory 
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government). Evidence of this relationship is found in Lord Byron‟s parliamentary 
speech to the House of Lords, on February 27, 1812, where he debates the Frame Work 
Bill. Anne Mellor explains, in a footnote to Byron‟s speech, that in November 1811,  
the unemployed stocking weavers of Nottingham (also known as “Luddites”), 
some of them near the point of starvation, began rioting and breaking the 
mechanized weaving frames that were costing them their jobs. The militia were 
called in, but were unable to stop the violence. The government then responded 
with the Tory-sponsored Frame Work Bill, which specified the death penalty for 
frame-breaking. (885)  
The fact that the rulers introduced the death penalty for the weavers presents a difficult 
situation in which to conflate weaver and ruler. Kamuf‟s description of the weaver/ruler 
overlooks two critical aspects: the class division, as represented in the riotous reaction of 





Apart from the gendered aspect of weaving, and the other forms of handiwork, namely 
sewing, knitting, quilting, etc., Kamuf also ignores, at a more costly price, the class 
divisions that make the weaver/ruler figure hard to see appropriate or even useful. Using 
the revolt of the Luddites during the first decade of the nineteenth century as a concrete 
example of the weaver/ruler relationship, we are more apt to identify with those 
associated with weaving as the opposite of those associated with ruling. Sometimes, 
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much to the chagrin of the die-hard-Derridean, there are relationships which are, in all 
reality, oppositional. Only in the sense that the weaver and the ruler are on opposite sides, 
of the coin, typographically represented/separated by a forward slash. Still, surprisingly, 
this difference is not Kamuf‟s intention. Weavers, contrarily, were in direct and overt 
opposition to the government and its subsequent passing of the 1811 Frame Work Bill.  
 
As Byron argues, “[b]y the adoption of one species of Frame in particular, one man 
performed the work of many, and the superfluous labourers were thrown out of 
employment,” causing the weavers to conceive “themselves to be sacrificed to 
improvements in mechanism” (885). In effect Byron suggests here, in advance of 
Heidegger, that it is being rendered obsolete that is at the heart of the matter: 
These men never destroyed their looms till they were become useless, worse than 
useless; till they were become actual impediments to their exertions in obtaining 
their daily bread. Can you, then, wonder that in times like these, when 
bankruptcy, convicted fraud, and imputed felony are found in a station not far 
beneath that of your Lordships, the lowest, though once most useful portion of the 
people, should forget their duty in their distresses, and become only less guilty 
than one of their representatives? (886)  
The only way in which weaver and ruler come remotely near one another is, as Byron 
reveals, in terms of the connection between the violence of the weavers and the violence 
of the politicians: “The framers of such a Bill must be content to inherit the honours of 
that Athenian lawgiver whose edicts were said to be written not in ink but in blood” 
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(886). The distance closes between the weaver and ruler figures only in consideration of 
the violence committed through their handiwork.   
 
In a very roundabout way, the weaver/ruler figure comes together once the worker has 
been pushed out. Consider this: in a variety of senses, the mechanized frames brought in 
to replace the weavers would have been the ones doing the „ruling‟ – in the sense of the 
actual ruling of lines, cutting, overall craftwork. As the machines replace the bodies of 
the weavers, these machines become the new weavers. Remembering that these 
mechanized weaving frames were defended by the government, we can come to align the 
weaver-machine with the ruler, each functioning as an extension of the other. Suddenly 
we are on the same grounds: weaver and ruler do in fact merge. However, this merging 
isn‟t expounded by Kamuf, but more alarmingly, it isn‟t possible to arrive at until the 
human has been drained and replaced by the machine. Working hard to make this point, 
partially in attempt of defending Kamuf whom I have sharply criticized, leaves me to 
offer a condition for the weaver/ruler figure to work. The condition to make Kamuf‟s 
weaver/ruler figure effective, however, insists on trading man for machine; this formula 
ultimately then only further exacerbates the distance between the weaver and ruler, never 
mind trying to yoke them together into one term.  
 
This anxiety over the line and frame, different kinds of handiwork in general, speaks to 
the connection and contention with industrialization, imperialism, and 
professionalization. In the professional arenas of art and education, tension between line 
and frame draws together with gender trouble in terms of women‟s work and its relation 
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to the Frame. As I will explain later on, education is a kind of framing mechanism also 




Furthermore, and perhaps even more surprisingly, Kamuf, without so much as a gesture 
or change in pronoun, doesn‟t address the fact that handiwork along the lines of sewing, 
knitting, weaving, was one of the few and important positions legitimated under the 
category of women‟s work during the nineteenth century. Had Kamuf examined the 
weaver/ruler figure in light of women‟s work, or more specifically women‟s wr iting from 
the period, she could have established a more legitimate context.  
 
Stitch „n Bitch 
 
Kamuf fails to mention, even in passing, the actual presence of the female weaver. This is 
particularly surprising considering the period she uses as her framework. As a quick 
survey of the literature from the Romantic period reveals there are a number of women 
writers who are either weavers themselves, or, who frequently use weaver imagery 
(quilting, sewing, tailoring) as their literary tropes.  
 
One such woman, Jane Taylor, draws explicitly upon female accomplishments in her 
1816 poem, “Accomplishment.” Taylor sardonically critiques the education of both men 
and women: “That drapery wrought by the leisurely fair / Call‟d patchwork, may well to 
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such genius compare” (9-10).  Taylor suggests that a man‟s education fails in that it gives 
him “every gift in the world, but a soul” (line 8), and a woman‟s education is a lesser 
education, “showy, but void of intelligent grace” (19). Taylor seems content with neither 
gender‟s state of education.  
 
Carol Shiner Wilson understands the young woman in Taylor‟s poem to be “nothing but a 
nervous confusion of mismatched fabric and design by her education […] unfit to assume 
the role of the Good Mother who can lovingly educate her children” (177). Yet, in 
describing the young woman‟s education as randomly thrown together, Wilson fails to 
note the deliberateness of this education. As Catherine Hobbs, in her examination of 
nineteenth-century literacy, notes, “[l]iteracy had become a key element in the social 
transformation to Victorian culture and the Cult of True Womanhood, with its tenets of 
piety, purity, domesticity, and submissiveness” (10). And yet, for Jane Taylor, literacy 
also is a tool of subversion. While literacy is deeply connected to social control, there are 
always already private and idiosyncratic ways to cuntaminate it. Hobbs further notes that 
“[w]omen‟s own power of active resistance to, or covert subversion of, efforts to 
socialize them remains another factor to consider,” and goes on to cite women‟s 
collective groups and imagined societies as initiatives to achieve “social reform instead of 
social control” (10). However, Hobbs plays into the dominant ideologies about myths of 
the piety, purity, and domesticity of these cloistered female educational collectives. What 
Taylor evokes, and what Wilson and Hobbs overlook, is the subtext of an erotic lesbian 




Both sexuality and female education are the focus of “Accomplishment,” and as a 
footnote indicates, Taylor is responding specifically to the “female accomplishments” as 
outlined by Mary Wollstonecraft in Vindication of the Rights of Woman: “Besides, 
whilst [women] are only made to acquire personal accomplishments, men will seek for 
pleasure in variety, and faithless husbands will make faithless wives” (88). A footnote 
explains that these “personal accomplishments” include the smattering of languages, 
needlework, and music that Taylor describes in “Accomplishment.” Taylor is continuing 
the same thread as Wollstonecraft, but takes the strain of sexuality briefly touched upon 
by Wollstonecraft here, and makes it far more obvious, appearing to celebrate its 
faithless, boundless pleasure.  
 
Taylor makes shrewd commentary on women‟s education, figuring the relationship 
between education/accomplishment and women as an erotically charged relationship. I 
suggest that Taylor presents the education as a sexualizing/eroticizing force/process, 
whereby women are products of sexing, revealing an educated woman as akin to a sexed 
woman. Taylor‟s poem also suggests that the process of education is akin to seduction, 
invoking quite vividly the erotically pedagogical relationship between knowledge/power, 
and teacher/student.  
 
Three stanzas (4, 6, and 7) in “Accomplishment” reveal Taylor‟s sexual descriptions of 
education:  
There glows a bright pattern (a spring or a spot) 
„Twixt clusters of roses full-blown and red hot; 
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Here magnified tulips divided in three, 
Alternately shaded with sections of tree. 
……………………………………………… 
„Tis thus Education (so call‟d in our schools) 
With costly materials, and capital tools,  
Sits down to her work, and at last she produces, 
Exactly the job that her customer chooses. 
 
See French and Italian spread out on her lap; 
Then Dancing springs up, and skips into a gap; 
Next Drawing and all its varieties come, 
Sew‟d down in their place by her finger and thumb. (13-28) 
Stanza four continues to describe the “patchwork,” although I argue that it rather 
naughtily describes aroused female genitalia: “roses full-blown and red hot” (18). The 
description of “magnified tulips divided in three” (19) intimately positions the reader, as 
if she were close enough (lips-to-lips) to see; closing the gap between cunning linguistics 
and cunninglingus. Finally, if the blown roses and spread tulips didn‟t evoke vaginas, as 
they did for Georgia O‟Keefe, the last detail, “shaded with sections of tree” (20), surely 
confirms our fantasy. As hot and full-blown as this reading is of stanza five, to delve a 
little deeper we might look more closely at the opening of the stanza: “‟Twixt clusters of 
roses” (17). Clusters, roses twixt. What comes, then, is an orgiastic homoerotic 
presentation of the process of educating women, of the sexual nature and energy within 
the closed circuit (separate sphere) of women‟s education, or educated groups. 
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Wollstonecraft is right that accomplishments could lead to “faithless wives,” and perhaps 
even intimates that this faithlessness will come within a cloistered erotic economy 
wherever women are alone together. Wollstonecraft notes that in “nurseries,” “boarding-
schools” (234), and “convents” (236), “many girls have learned very nasty tricks […] 
women are in general too familiar with each other, which leads to that gross degree of 
familiarity that so frequently renders the marriage state unhappy” (234). Wollstonecraft 
doesn‟t explain what it is that renders what precise part of the “marriage state” unhappy, 
but her prolonged hang-up on this issue is quite revealing. It seems that it has part to do 
with a specific part – though she certainly doesn‟t reveal what exact part it is either: 
“How can delicate women obtrude on notice that part of the animal economy, which is so 
very disgusting?” (235). We might speculate that this “animal economy” is the 
vagina/anus – given their proximity to defecation and to the ground. Still, as obtuse as 
Wollstonecraft is, she is just as persistent. It certainly seems that Wollstonecraft has 
bedroom eyes, admitting perhaps to her own participation in prior lesbian bedchamber 
antics: “I cannot recollect, without indignation, the jokes and hoyden tricks which knots 
of young women indulged themselves in” (236) […] “And what nasty indecent tricks do 
they not also learn from each other, when a number of them pig together in the same 
bedchamber” (282). Wollstonecraft appears to know something about bedchamber 
debaucheries, which she describes, despite pledging her disgust, with a sadomasochistic 





Throughout “Accomplishment” we move onto different planes of voyeurism. This 
subterranean sexing begins in stanza four where we see the female body described, and 
progresses to stanza seven, where we watch the female body being sexed up. Stanza 
seven scintillatingly progresses in its sexual description of the scene of education, going 
layer under layer with each line: “spread out on her lap” (25); “skips into a gap” (26); “its 
varieties come […] by her finger and thumb” (27-8). Self-mastery in terms of education 
also figures/fingers as masturbation: coming by finger and thumb – although it isn‟t 
limited to masturbation here: coming by “her” touch is also suggestive of another woman, 
reinforcing the difficulty in determining who is touching (which “her”) from the outside 
of this erotic economy. Augmenting this suggestive poem is Taylor‟s use of the word 
“customer” (24), which connects education to prostitution. Considering who might be the 
customer Taylor speaks of here leads us to consider a husband figure. Seeing the 
customer/husband relation calls to mind again Wollstonecraft‟s initial warning that 
“faithless husbands will make faithless wives” (88).  
 
Some may be quick to charge the connection between sex and education as evidence of 
misogyny, of the puppetering of women by men by virtue of a patchwork education 
chosen by men. However, I would argue that as Taylor depicts the relationship, it would 
be a mistake to think that men are behind the sexing of the young lady. In this poem, 
women motivate the sexual pedagogy towards other women.  
 
There are some similarities between Taylor and Shelley Jackson; both women writers 
work explicitly with the “patchwork” (Taylor in “Accomplishment” and Jackson in 
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Patchwork Girl) sharing as well an interest in children‟s stories. It isn‟t impossible to 
imagine Jackson drawing upon Taylor as a source of inspiration. As stanza seven in 
“Accomplishment” reveals, Taylor is able to make subjects (French, Italian, Dancing, 
Drawing) come to a surreal life, embodying a technique not unlike magic realism; a 
technique that Jackson revels in throughout her short stories Melancholy of Anatomy, 
where individual body parts come to life independent of the larger body.  Before I stray 
too far into Shelley Jackson, there is another important aspect of the “patchwork” that 
hasn‟t yet been addressed, and yet is necessary in bringing us back to the weaver/ruler.  
 
In “Accomplishment” Taylor relentlessly works to establish the patchwork quality of the 
woman‟s education through her rhetoric: “drapery” (9); “patchwork” (10); “pattern” (11); 
“labour of years” (17); “sew‟d down” (28); “fanciful robes” (29); “sewn into shape” (32); 
“portions and patches” (35); “stitch‟d up together” (36). Clearly then, women‟s 
accomplishments and education are a sort of patchwork.  
 
Taylor uses patchwork as an alternative/opposition to artwork. Taylor stresses the 
troubled relationship between woman and frame, as evidenced through the inability of 
representing the crisis of the woman by a single image, at least as one that can be easily 
framed. Earlier in “Accomplishment,” Taylor specifically mentions Claude Gellee (“paint 
like a Claude” (6)), which, as the footnote explains, represents  
Claude Lorrain (1600-1682), professional name Claude Gellee, frequently 
shortened to Claude, French landscape painter famed for his depictions of 
 
 22 
idealized classical Italian landscapes, the painter of “the beautiful” in landscape. 
(Mellor 841) 
F.V. Barry‟s interpretation of Taylor‟s poetry involves seeing her poem as picture: 
“[Taylor‟s] conventional pictures – “Morning,” “Evening,” and the rest, framed to fit 
chosen spaces on the Nursery wall – have a light and colour of their own” (xii). Reading 
Taylor‟s “Accomplishment” this way is counterintuitive to its meaning, which hinges 
upon not being framed. Despite some similarities between male and female handiwork, 
including some of the rhetoric and terminology, there is a fundamental difference which 
distinctly separates the two; the frame. So, again, we can see how the frame figures in a 
variety of contexts. There is the weaver‟s frame, and the frame of the artwork. Just as the 
Luddites rail against the mechanized frames, Taylor similarly rails against the frames that 
define and delimit meaning, such as artwork.  
 
If the aim of conventional portraiture is to express some aspect of the inner life of the 
individual through the external signs of the body, as Claude does with landscapes, or as 
Keats does with the Grecian Urn, then the portrait of the woman presented in 
“Accomplishment” expresses the difficulty in framing the subject(s) of female education.   
 
Patchwork is not art, as Taylor makes clear in stanza five:   
But when all is finish‟d, this labour of years, 
A mass unharmonious, unmeaning appears; 
„Tis showy, but void of intelligent grace; 
It is not a landscape, it is not a face. (17-20) 
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Here, I argue, the frame makes the difference. Works done by women are 
accomplishments not art, done in their laps, not to be hung in a gallery or a museum. 
Taylor‟s deliberate reference to Claude Gellee, known for being the professional painter 
of “the beautiful” is particularly striking. At work here are issues of class: professional 
handiwork versus private handiwork, as well as issues of gender: women‟s handiwork is 
largely deemed as accomplishments (still private sphere) rather than part of the discourse 
of artwork.  Taylor‟s stinging rhetoric in describing women‟s work as “unmeaning,” is 
powerful. It seems to me to be a direct confrontation of how meaning is ascribed, such as 
„the beautiful‟ as belonging to whatever Claude decides, saying that women can only 
expect, even after many laborious years, to produce “unmeaning,” something “showy, but 
void of intelligent grace” (18-9).  
 
Women‟s work then is in a troubled position. Lacking the defining frame, the definitive 
frame of the art work, women‟s work even lacks the ability to participate in the discourse. 
And yet, without the frame, women‟s work is free from the confining space of the frame. 
There is also the possibility that being “not a landscape…not a face” (20) is suggestive of 
staying in motion. Continual movement would resist the static nature of being framed, 
perhaps as another means of resisting the frame. This connects nicely with the Luddites, 
who manage to resist the mechanized frames while simultaneously resisting arrest.  
 
This unruliness complements the inner “unmeaning” of, as Taylor so aptly calls, 
women‟s handiwork (whether it is sewing, knitting, or writing), as both run resistance to 
the „masterpiece‟ mentality, the notion of the untouchable transcendent text, a desire 
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found infamously in painters such as Claude, and male poets such as Keats. Taylor‟s 
writing suggests that the quest for a „masterpiece‟ is an untenable position for women. 
Then there is perhaps the sense that “patchwork” itself takes on another meaning here; an 
idiom for the all-female physical terrain, homoerotic environment, “[a]lternately shaded 
with sections of tree” (16). But, if their handiwork is devoid of “intelligible grace,” it is 
made up for with great orgiastic sex – trading brush for bush. If women cannot break into 
the sphere of „art,‟ men can similarly not penetrate the closed confines of women‟s 
“patchwork.”  
  
The angle of “Accomplishment” places the reader in a different relationship to the work 
than that traditionally imposed by canonical literature. If the conventional approach for 
reading such literature is to stand back, almost reverentially as one would in a gallery, in 
a manner that parallels the way in which many male poets wrote (Keats to the Urn), the 
work of many women writers during this period invites the reader to approach, touch, and 
be involved in the process of representation by the act of turning the pages, and peeking 
under the layers. This runs against the grain of writers such as Keats, for whom in “Ode 
on a Grecian Urn” the masterpiece is untouchable and motionless:  
Bold lover, never, never canst thou kiss,  
Though winning near the goal – yet, do not grieve; 
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy 
bliss. (16-19) 
Just as the masterpiece is untouchable, the characters of the masterpiece are also unable 
to touch. Here, Keats presents the masterpiece and sex as elusive. Despite the fact that the 
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urn is not framed like a painting, it is framed in the sense that it is a still-life, its motion 
captured, and identified as being untouchable. This restraint, respect for the dividing line, 
is treated in a markedly different way in women‟s poetry. In “Accomplishment” Taylor 
invitingly brings the reader voyeuristically into sexual relationship with the education of 
a young woman. Taylor asks her reader to see the subtext, the layers under layers, rather 
than stand back behind the rope or glass or look at it like a painting. Gone is the purity of 
the moment, the safe distance between text and reader. Furthermore, as a queer female 
reader, the parameters of the text and its homoerotic subtexts spill over the edges of the 
text in a way that blurs my ability to stand back and maintain any critical distance 
between the poem and myself.   
 
Taylor‟s female subject is touchable, to a selective audience, and yet does not bear the 
sterility of the off-limits artwork. Unlike her male counterparts, she does not lose the 
physical/sexual being of the body, or turn the body into a „standing-reserve‟ of patches. 
Clearly showing depth with a clever and coy rhetoric of “unmeaning,” Taylor retains the 
scrawling sexuality of women, the presence of female physicality and of its eroticism 
rather than simply see it as „standing-reserve‟ for sloppy secondary education, or as a 
baby-making machine. Examining the woman only as a patchwork is to accept the 
framework, and allow the patchwork to stand metonymically for the woman, all the while 
ignoring the excessive sexuality.   
 
In the diverse gamut of eighteenth century signatures, events, and contexts, it is revealed 
that people along class and gender lines are working through certain problems of textual 
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and iconographic representation. And yet, as different in subject and in form as they all 
are from one another, there remains a continuous thread, the obsessive repetition of the 























CHAPTER 3: Patchwork, Patchwriting, Patchwiring 
 
The screen is a dim page spread before us, white and silent. 
[…] and in the darkening and awful expanse of screen 
something has kept on, a film we have not learned to 
see…it is now a closeup of the face, a face we all know – 
[…] at this dark and silent frame - Pynchon 887 
 
 
As the mechanized frames of the eighteenth-century initiated this struggle between 
worker and frame and became the early touchstone for writer/frame engagements with 
textuality, a parallel phenomenon occurs in the late twentieth century between worker 
and computerized frame. Now, new issues regarding textuality and narrative arise from 
the hypertext framework. And, interestingly enough, just as the work produced by the 
mechanized frames in the Romantic period was called „spider-work‟, the same 
description applies to the very structure and functionality of hypertext, and general 
computer rhetoric (the web, the Net, links, threads).  
 
In fact, within the discussions surrounding electronic writing, we see the contentious 
patchwork explicitly resurface as “patchwriting.” As Bill Marsh explains, patchwriting is 
a form of plagiarism that can be traced back to Montaigne “who identified „patchwork‟ as 
a weaker form of rhetorical invention made better by recourse to a poetics of literary 
transmutation” (113). According to Marsh, the contemporary practice of patchwriting 
describes the practice whereby the source text is copied, cut/up, rearranged, passages 
deleted and synonyms plugged in (113). Kathy Acker is one infamous patchwriter whose 
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influence finds traces in Shelley Jackson, who gives patchwriting added meaning in her 
experimental hypertexts.  
 
Bridging the gap between Romanticism and postmodernism‟s engagement with the 
patchwork is Shelley Jackson‟s Patchwork Girl, a text owing a lot to Shelley‟s 
Frankenstein, which reveals another explicit engagement with the patchwork and the 
frame. In Shelley‟s text, Frankenstein frequently refers to the body itself as a frame:  
to prepare a frame […] with all its intricacies of fibres, muscles, and veins […] I 
collected bones from charnel houses; and disturbed, with profane fingers, the 
tremendous secrets of the human frame. (81-2) 
If the relation of patchwork to frame takes on a monstrous quality in Shelley‟s text– the 
patchwork is monstrous, with emphasis on its abjectness, evidenced in how the monster 
is made; stitched together from variegated body parts, laid out and pinned down to its 
framework– then in Jackson‟s hypertextual reworking, it is monstrous but in an ugly way; 
in the way that the body on the table has faded, even disappeared, and the focus of what 
is left are the various pins on the table. Reading Jackson‟s hypertext we see through what 
is left of the body, only to play connect the dots. Jackson glorifies the framework, 
pushing the body into/ under the table so that we might get a better look at the pins. This 
is a gesture of fetishizing technology, the truest sense of death denial – bringing back the 
dead female creature from the bottom of the sea only to preserve/drown it again in the 
deep labyrinth of code, this time only further shattering it: a technique akin to 




Another interpretation of the rage against the patchwork comes from cultural 
anthropologist, Ernest Becker, who suggests that embedded within the desire to deny our 
finitude is the desire to deny our creatureliness. Following Kierkegaard, Becker insists 
that “[t]he creatureliness is the terror” (87). This fear of death, and of lack of specialness, 
leads to what Marcel O‟Gorman calls “heroic projects” (“Death By Computer” 17).  It is 
not a stretch to see Shelley Jackson‟s hypertext, Patchwork Girl, as a Beckerian heroic 
project. Its extremely positive critical reception from a diverse array of sources reinforces 
Jackson‟s and her text‟s legitimacy as a groundbreaking, or rather gravebreaking, 
example of hypertext fiction. Doyens of the postmodern literary avant-garde, Robert 
Coover, and hypertext theorists, George Landow, proudly flaunt Jackson‟s contribution 
to experimental postmodern (e)literature, calling it “serious hypertext,” and “a true 
paradigmatic work of the era” (Eastgate). For its return to the crime scene, Patchwork 
Girl is championed by cyberfeminists for offering a “modem of one‟s own” – to quote 
Jodey Castricano.  
 
Jackson‟s text also holds its own in its ability to persevere. Twelve years since its 
publication, the main page of the Eastgate Systems website still touts it as its “best-
selling title.” Jackson‟s project has come to embody a certain Promethianism – aside 
from the fact that it is bleedingly suggested by the subtitles of both Frankenstein; “A 
Modern Prometheus,” and Patchwork Girl “A Modern Monster.”  
 
Promethian projects, or perhaps self-described monstrous projects, such as Jackson‟s 
hypertext, prompt Becker to warn that the driving force behind such projects, namely the 
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terror over our finitude, leads to “a defiant Promethianism that is basically innocuous: the 
confident power that can catapult man to the moon and free him somewhat of his 
complete dependence and confinement on earth” (85). Frankenstein and its various 
offspring always already serve as Promethean heroes, and vice versa. Heroic projects, 
like getting man on the moon, or preserving bodies in code or cryogenetic deep freeze, 
can also take on what Becker calls “the ugly side of this Promethianism […] the empty-
headed immersion in the delights of technics” (85).  
 
While it is undoubtedly worthwhile to examine Jackson‟s “delights of technics,” 
particularly in terms of her techniques – given the appropriateness of hypertext to her 
project of speaking to/with theory, theoretical figures, and even on a larger scale, of 
aesthetic parallels between the periods she straddles, namely postmodernism and 
Romanticism – most of the existing criticism surrounding the Patchwork Girl already 
overstresses the importance of its hypertext structure.  
 
The existing body of Jackson criticism enacts Becker‟s ugly Promethianism, a kind of 
genetic essentialism; of reducing and worshipping Patchwork Girl on the grounds of its 
molecular genetic code. By doing so, we are privileging a very reductive reading; like 
visiting a website and reading/looking at it for its source code, oohing and ahhing over 
the hotlinks. Maybe there are some who enjoy reading code, but that kind of 
reading/looking is different than a deeper reading/looking. As Heidegger suggests, “[s]o 
long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will to 
master it. We press on past the essence of technology” (32). Focusing on the 
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technological apparatus, then, causes us to miss the „essence‟ of a „thing‟ (Heidegger‟s 
word), or the impact of art. Friedrich Kittler, following Heidegger, suggests more 
poetically that “[t]he soul becomes a neurophysiological apparatus only when the end of 
literature draws near” (130). What Kittler suggests here is the danger we place ourselves 
in when we no longer see the „essence‟ in art, or even art or literature at all. The danger 
of disembodiment threatens our body/mind connection when our art/technis connection is 
threatened. Thus, following and modifying Becker‟s haunting warning of the 
overproduction of truths, we should be weary of the overproduction of technics.   
 
And yet, we should also be weary of losing praxis. Becker himself overlooks the ugly 
side of an anti-Promethianism, in what I see as the manifestation of a virulent anti-
technology anti-aestheticism, particularly within the humanities. Slightly biting the hand 
that feeds me, a quick survey of faculty webpages and course-sites, suggests that English 
professors often dismiss even basic aesthetic principles of webdesign. One surprising 
example of this is Gregory Ulmer, teletheorist and electracian par excellence, whose 
official website is strangely stagnant – an adjective otherwise completely antithetical to 
his critical thought! Without addressing the synthesis between art and techne, and by 
obstinately rejecting design aesthetics, intellectuals such as Ulmer are inevitably bringing 
their own theories into their own sort of finitude. When it comes to all matters of 
electronic literacy, or „electracy‟ as Ulmer calls it, there appears to either be the complete 
embracing of technis, or none at all; content at the cost of theory, or theory at the cost of 




Further exacerbating the art/techne dualist divide is what Hubert Dreyfus calls, in 
referring to the Internet, the “flattening effect.” As Dreyfus explains it, “[t]he problem is 
that, as far as meaning is concerned, all hyperlinks are alike” (12). This leads to the 
flattening out of meaning. Although Dreyfus is referring to the Internet, his discussion of 
hyperlinks is particularly transferable to discussions of hypertext. I recognize Jackson‟s 
linked structure as a good gesture, a performance of post-structuralist thinking, but there 
is a difference in looking and reading, and the sheer propensity of links, and the nature of 
how we otherwise always already treat links – the idea of clicking through – foregrounds 
the viewer/reader‟s experience of Patchwork Girl. Thus, while in many ways Jackson is 
here embodying, actually putting theory into practice, its effectiveness, or impact is still 
beyond our grasp, perhaps largely due to the framework that its entirety hinges on. As 
Peters laments,  
[i]f only the signifying vehicles would vanish so that we could see into each 
other‟s hearts and minds, genuine communication would be possible. If only we 
were angels, with transparent bodies and transparent thoughts. (qtd. in O‟Gorman 
13)   
In many ways, if only Jackson‟s hypertext were not a hypertext; as Hayles notes, “the 
system generating a reality is shown to be part of the reality it makes […] reflexivity has 
subversive effects because it confuses and entangles the boundaries we impose on the 
world in order to make sense of that world” (8-9). The closed system Hayles describes, 
that is indicative of our recording technologies today, complements Dreyfus‟ experience 
of disembodied space on/in the Net. As Dreyfus notes, “[i]n cyberspace, then, without 
our embodied ability to grasp meaning, relevance slips through our non-existent fingers” 
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(26). Of course, this is quite possibly Jackson‟s point; demonstrating, in practice again, 
post-structural theory‟s fondness towards decentering, subverting, and deprivileging texts 
of their authority. Nevertheless, the powerful impact it could have on us is lost, at least 
now, when the number of websites has grown exponentially, and the number of 
hyperlinks is at apocalyptic proportions. It is not because it is a melting-pot of text from 
Derrida, Mary Shelley, etc. It is because we only have to look rather than read, 
distractedly clicking through them, that any larger importance or effect the text is to have 
on me is lost. What is experienced is, perhaps, some sense of a Heideggerian “boredom,” 
which Giorgio Agamben describes as when “we are riveted and delivered over to what 
bores us” (64). And, if the answer to this is that this is a self-reflexive technique, to call 
attention to the way in which we confront hypertext, or, that it means nothing at all, then 
its fate is sealed, and is in fact guilty of all the postmodern perversities, of Kierkegaardian 
coffee-housing, as well as Becker‟s charge of “ugly Promethianism.” This is the danger I 
envision as a result of playing with technics; that we have closed ourselves in within a 
system; that we will no longer be able to speak to/with, or of the „essence‟ of a text, as a 
result of how completely enframed it is by its form, which we have made to be both a 
process and a product, and yet, can no longer separate the two.  
 
There is a certain irony in applying the best secular Ur-text of immortality, the myth of 
Prometheus, to a technology that will be perhaps outdated before even fully developed. 
Jackson‟s hypertext cannot compare to the cinematic progenies of the Prometheus myth 
which continue to fill theatre seats, the most fundamental difference being the film‟s 
embodied presence of the human. While Jackson‟s text does have images, they are highly 
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abstracted, black and white sketches, fragments, most offensively without any sense of 
messy fluids. To take Sidney Perkowitz slightly out of context: “regardless of what is 
going on inside an artificial being […] the merest hint of humanlike action or appearance 
deeply engages us” (2). If the images were more iconic to the bodies of our meat reality, 
we would at least be able to indulge in our postmodern fetish for ourselves, or just the 
same – the simulation of ourselves. The images theoretically offer Jackson an opportunity 
to launch another theoretical probe, such as the line of argument that Peters notes: 
“[e]lectronic media both supplement and transform the nineteenth-century culture of 
doppelgangers by duplicating and distributing indicia of human presence” (141). 
Unfortunately, Jackson‟s images do not realize or even reach for their potential power.  
 
Hayles‟ description of her own project lends itself uncannily to what could be the ideal 
summation of Jackson‟s hypertext: “This book is a rememory […] putting back together 
parts that have lost touch with one another and reaching out toward a complexity too 
unruly to fit into disembodied ones and zeros” (13). This notion of parts being „too 
unruly‟ to be embodied in a disembodied code should be the quality of the Patchwork 
Girl, as opposed to how it currently fits onto a thin CD-ROM, kept locked away in the 
bowels of the library archives. We should be critically skeptical of Jackson‟s success, 
especially considering who has been prescribing it (George Landow, whose definition of 
hypertext trumps all others – Eastgate Systems, the site which has a hand in Jackson‟s 
purse). If anything, Jackson‟s potentially aggressive anti-establishment avant-garde 
narrative falls victim to new media; to the communicative systems and technologies built 
and bred on the sterilization and professionalization of disembodied information. Jackson 
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operates smoothly, according to code, even listing properly cited footnotes when she 
refers to Derrida – rather than playing sardonically, or dangerously cuntaminating. There 
are no bodily fluids for Jackson. Patchwork Girl plays operates nicely with others. Too 
nicely for my liking.  
      
So while we may talk, indebted to Becker, about the “ugly side of Promethianism,” of 
progress for progress sake, we could similarly see Jackson‟s text as praxis for theory‟s 
sake. For, aside from hitting poststructural g-spots, such as the rhizome, fragment, 
schizoid, the hypertext certainly feels ugly. Perhaps all of us needed to shudder (again) 
first at its unfortunate level of aestheticism, then at the way in which we cannot recognize 
our own humanness anywhere within the text (unless perhaps we self-identify as a 
posthuman or cyborg), and finally in the sense that the hypertext technology, delivered no 
less on a CD-ROM that already looks antiquated, reveals – quite transparently – the 
falseness of our human desire of immortality. Investing energy into making something 
immortal is wasted, perhaps perversely so, given the short lifespan of the hypertext 
medium itself. Arguably, hypertext literature‟s heyday has already come and gone with 
the mid-nineties. This investment in a medium that we might always already see as 
almost-living or almost-dead, any „creative, experimental‟ work done using hypertext, 
ultimately seems to be the project of the last man. Following Francis Fukuyama‟s notion 
of the „last man,‟ using hypertext isn‟t dangerous, and not very risky – since we 
encounter it in very banal ways, embedded in webpages that many of us stare at for the 
majority of our day. There is no real fear, no real risk, it is a very safe space – so much so 
it is uncomfortably reminiscent of the domestic sphere, especially when we consider how 
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in the name itself, Patchwork Girl, conjures engendered ideas of „women‟s work‟; sewing 
and quilting.   
 
Interestingly, rather than expressing any sort of megalothymic pride for it, Jackson shies 
away, reminiscent of when Wiener looks “into the mirror of the cyborg but then 
withdraws,” afraid of the hideous boundary blurring (Hayles 108). Jackson even throws 
her authorship into question, during an address at MIT (“Stitch Bitch”). Rather than revel 
in her project as a work of great self-reflexivity, the reality of it suggests that it isn‟t the 
future of writing, or even of her writing, nor is it the future of radicality simply due to its 
„new‟ form(at). 
 
In one sense Jackson is clearly aware of the finite body: in fact, it is a remembering (pun 
intended) of the dismembered female body from Mary Shelley‟s Frankenstein. It is 
perhaps most obviously a return to the physical body that is at the core of the story. Yet, 
on closer inspection, the body is forgotten (again), at least in its fleshy, composite 
wholeness. The female body is presented in fragments; revived from the dead but 
refusing to be made into something „whole‟ again – seemingly reveling in the 
postmodern affinity for the fragmented, schizoid identity.  
 
It is possible that the first death the female creature died at the hands of Mary Shelley 
was far less violent than at the hands of Shelley Jackson. In Frankenstein the female 
creature is exposed and disposed all in the span of a few pages (189-196) and with little 
detail. Furthermore, most of the narrative space is given to Frankenstein‟s psychological 
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struggle over whether or not to create the female creature rather than the description of 
the actual event. In fact, the dismemberment and disposal only consume a few scattered 
paragraphs:  
I thought with a sensation of madness on my promise of creating another like him, 
and, trembling with passion, tore to pieces the thing on which I was engaged. 
(191) 
The remains of the half-finished creature, whom I had destroyed, lay scattered on 
the floor, and I almost felt as if I had mangled the living flesh of a human being 
[…] I accordingly put [the body parts] into a basket, with a great quantity of 
stones and laying them up, determined to throw them into the sea that very night. 
(194-5)  
In fact, the way in which Frankenstein treats this body dump is strangely melancholic and 
peaceful, particularly in terms of what he does after he disposes of the body: “[I] cast my 
basket into the sea; listened to the gurgling sound as it sunk […] stretched myself at the 
bottom of the boat […] the murmur lulled me, and in a short time I slept soundly” (195). 
Frankenstein reveals here a strange closeness with the sea (typically gendered female) 
and the mutilated body; a strange closeness that he shares with other men of the time, 
such as male-midwives. One noted figure, William Hunter, straddles the border between 
male/female and life/death in his precarious position as male-midwife. The 
physiological/anatomical intimacy inherent from working within a women‟s profession 
as well as on women‟s bodies leaves Hunter queerly aligned with women, “open to 
insinuating remarks about hypocritical „men of feeling‟” (Hunter qtd. in Cohen 389). 
Furthermore, Hunter‟s work reveals that his involvement with women‟s bodies is on the 
 
 38 
condition of their death and dissection. This strange combination of the maternal and 
macabre that Hunter embodies is also shared by Frankenstein.  
 
Jackson, contrary to Shelley, sadistically revives the female monster, which originally 
figured in only a few pages of Shelley‟s novel, only to splinter her liminal presence by a 
magnification of 200x. Jackson, in over 200 different lexias, disembodies the character 
further than ever before, into encyclopedic proportions of the molecular scale. The lexias 
range from a few pages long to a few sentences short, themselves a patchwork of words. 
And, let us not forget the violence inherent in the medium Jackson arms herself with – 
hypertext, an offshoot of the Net, is itself a technological storage medium with 
militaristic origins.  
 
What is apparent here is the violence associated with framing technologies. 
Compounding this calculated scientific magnification and splintering of identity into 
parts, and parts within parts, is the misgiving of dealing with code and not a body. 
Whether it is genetic or programmatic, what is essential is that everything is enframed as 
code. And yet, if this is how we continue to interrogate this text – by only focusing on its 
frame – the question becomes whether the connective (t)issue at hand is not flesh but 







CHAPTER 4: Helter Skelter 
 
Uninspired by seeing framework become frameworship, I need the body to reappear. Not 
just any body, but the human body, the fleshy, meat reality of the body. In order for us to 
let the framework fade, we confront the finite body and admit that we are (still) not 
disembodied uploaded-consciousnesses in machines.   
 
I believe the most successful way of grounding the body involves the ground. The grave. 
Mud and shit. Our excremental signature. And to look to ground us, I see the writers of 
the Romantic period, specifically Blake as being engaged with finitude; their signatures 
already grounded in the body, a time when death and writing are engaged in tandem – 
this, as a solvent to the existing signature scholarship done primarily by Kamuf which 
incorrectly overlooks any context, physicality, or human factor/essence inherent in the 
signature. I posit that the future of theory demands a return to the body, and that it will be 
found using tropes and tripes from the Romantic period – a period that already shares 
much in common with the postmodern, but has the benefit of still believing in/touching 
the finite, fleshy body. I share this revenant with David Simpson who admits:  
I am especially anxious to recover the historical foundation for Derrida in the 
writings of Rousseau – though I thereby risk the accusation of an outmoded 
concern for origins – because I want to ask some questions about his common 
history with Blake, and because I sense that this relation to the past is not much 




Simpson is right to feel anxious and to recognize the unpopularity of such an approach, 
but also to identify the limitation of this theory, and to push past it. Like Simpson, then, I 
return to the period and even to Blake, but rather than limit my argument to Blake and 
Derrida, I aim to flesh out a better history (also known as event and context) for the 
signature at large. I tether the signature to the body, using examples from the eighteenth-
century as I think this is the period when authorship and the body are so closely engaged; 
a tethering which reinforces the finitude of the human and the humanness/finitude of the 




Blake is the eighteenth-century figure who must be included in the discussion of 
signatures, stitching, and shitting; who in his marginalia and in a marginal reading 
embodies all the concerns of this essay. Similar to Taylor who makes the distinction 
between patchwork and artwork, Blake makes the same point over a musing on his own 
signature. 
 
Appended to his signature in William Upcott‟s autograph-album is an annotation. 
Transcribed by David V. Erdman, in The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, 
the annotation to the autograph reads: 
The above was written & the drawing annexed by the desire of Mr Leigh how far 
it is an Autograph is a Question I do not think an Artist can write an Autograph 
especially one who has Studied in the Florentine & Roman Schools as such an 
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one will Consider what he is doing but an Autograph as I understand it, is Writ 
helter skelter like a hog upon a rope or a Man who walks without Considering 
whether he shall run against a Post or a House or a Horse or a Man & I am apt to 
believe that what is done without meaning is very different from that which a Man 
Does with his Thought & Mind & ought not to be Calld by the Same Name. I 
consider the Autograph of Mr Cruikshank which very justly stands first in the 
Book & that Beautiful Specimen of Writing by Mr Comfield & my own; as 
standing [in] the same Predicament they are in some measure Works of Art & not 
of Nature or Chance […]. (698)  
Blake makes a distinction between different line works: art is pitted against the signature. 
As Blake says, “I do not think an Artist can write an Autograph,” because as an artist, 
“one will Consider what he is doing.” By figuratively describing the act of signing as “a 
hog upon a rope,” Blake evokes the rope as the thread; a sort of primitive, bestial 
handiwork. Despite the fact that Blake admits his own uncertainty over whether his 
signature is a work of art or work of nature or chance, it also sounds as if Blake would 
like to draw the line between art and the rest: “I am apt to believe that what is done 
without meaning is very different from that which a Man Does with his Thought & Mind 
& ought not to be Calld by the Same Name.”  
 
The direction of Blake‟s argument might seem to suggest that authorial intention makes 
the difference between work of art and work of nature/chance. However, this is clearly 
not the case considering how the line that is drawn with a hog and rope clashes with 
Blake‟s famous description of the importance of the line: the “great and golden rule of 
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art” is “the more distinct, sharp and wirey the bounding line, the more perfect the work of 
art” (Catalogue 63). Thus, the line, rather than intention, determines the kind and value of 
handiwork, rather than intention being perfectly embodied in the distinct line.  
 
In another sense, equating the signature with the rope also evokes the washing line, 
giving the imagery of the hog running around “helter skelter” with the rope the possibility 
of having run right out of any number of poems from Barbauld, perhaps “Washing-Day.” 
Blake‟s hog-on-a-rope is also the line on which gender and class references hang, 
particularly in evoking the washing line with its charged feminine and rural connotations. 
Handwork again here is defined and delimited based on gender differences, just as it is 
for Taylor between women‟s line work (patchwork) and men‟s line work („the beautiful‟ 
in art, painted lines); as well as class differences, the line of rope attached to the hog 
evoking the washing line of the rural scene, and sharp/wirey line evoking mechanical 
technological progress and privilege. While the line is a restraint to keep the pig from 
ruining things, it gets loose anyway – helter skelter!  
 
Questionably, I am taking the hog too seriously, at the risk of getting hung up on the rope 
of the hog. Still…stele… 
 
Blake‟s evocation of the hog is not simply a trope. The hog, as a lecture by G.E. Bentley 
entitled “Freaks of Learning: Learned Pigs, Musical Hares, and the Romantics” reveals, 
is a popular and politicized figure for the Romantics. An announcement in the Daily 
Universal Reporter reveals the talents of the Learned Pig: 
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This entertaining and sagacious animal casts accounts by means of Typographical 
cards, in the same manner as a Printer composes, and by the same method sets 
down any capital or Surname, reckons the number of People present, tells by 
evoking on a Gentleman‟s Watch in company what is the Hour and Minutes; he 
likewise tells any Lady‟s Thoughts in company, and distinguishes all sorts of 
colours. (qtd. in Bentley 9) 
This description of the learned pig reveals how the composition method of the printer is 
equated with that of the pig that pushes paper around on the ground: “by the same method 
sets down any capital or Surname.” This suggests an actual historical event to 
contextualize Blake‟s comment about the signature as a hog on a rope. Perhaps it even 
implies motivation for why Blake chooses the pig: a reaction against being equated, even 
threatened, with the similar methodology of a pig. The pig pushing typographical cards in 
place is akin to printers pushing around moveable type, and their relationship to the 
name, of having to push it into place, is the same. Not only does the pig push, but it also 
digs. The pig, digging in the mud, is similar to Blake‟s engraving method, which involves 
hand drawing on copper, digging hard into the whole plates. Perhaps Blake is anxious 
about pigwork since like the pig he digs around in muck. He is not the only one; if we dig 
far enough into the mess, we find Burke also taking digs at the mass, characterizing them 
as pigs: “learning will be cast into the mire, and trodden down under the hoofs of a 
swinish multitude” (97-8). Burke finds himself in the pigpen next to Rousseau. Mary 
Wollstonecraft, who, as I explained earlier, describes the trouble that comes from girls 
“pigging together,” also smears Rousseau as a pig:  “His ridiculous stories, which tend to 
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prove that girls are naturally attentive to their persons […] should be selected with the 
anecdotes of the learned pig” (129).  
 
As Bentley reveals, even Wordsworth weighed in on the pig. In a description of St. 
Bartholomew‟s Fair from The Prelude (1805), Wordsworth reveals a rather poignant 
feature of the pig: the way in which it gestures at something beyond itself but also 
reminds us of our finitude:  
All moveables of wonder, from all parts, 
Are here – Albinos, painted Indians, Dwarfs, 
The Horse of knowledge, and the learned Pig 
… 
All out-o‟-the-way, far-fetched, perverted things, 
All freaks of nature, all Promethean thoughts 
Of man, his dullness, madness, and their feats 
All jumbled up together. (qtd. in Bentley 20) 
That the pig is at once an emblem of man‟s Promethean thoughts – dreams of 
immortality, of overcoming oneself – and “dulness” is striking. Though neither 
Wordsworth nor Bentley elaborates on these lines, the pig both fascinates us by being 
like us (engaging language) and simultaneously and crudely reminds us of our proximity 
to the ground, to our defecating bodies. The pig, more than any other animal, heightens 
this attraction/repulsion and anxiety as it is the animal most like us, learned and with the 
same-coloured skin, and yet the animal most commonly associated with the “dirty and 
disorderly” (Bentley 1). Both the pig and Promethean Frankenstein creature are freaks of 
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learning; freakish pupils, having the ability to outstrip the categories and expectations we 
give them. A pig pushing around letters and the creature as dead come back to life: it is a 
matter of being in-between life/death; they are in effect the “/” of such categories.  
 
In fact, the pig and the Frankenstein creature intersect explicitly in Shelley‟s 
Frankenstein, when the creature recounts taking refuge from “the barbarity of man” at the 
back of a cottage in a pigsty: “It was situated against the back of the cottage, and 
surrounded on the sides which were exposed by a pig-stye and a clear pool of water […] 
all the light I enjoyed came through the stye” (133). Further intersection is in the 
invocation of the Learned Pig, emphasized when the creature starts to learn language 
(133-141). Ultimately, the creature is undeniably framed as an “animal,” as the freakishly 
precocious pig, taking refuge at the back of the house with the other animals, and is 
starkly contrasted with the educated man, Frankenstein, who takes “refuge in the court-
yard belonging to the house which [he] inhabited,” from the creature (86). 
 
Bentley reveals that “these Learned Pigs […] remind Mary Wollstonecraft of the 
masculine prejudice of the world, or at any rate of Rousseau” (25). Wollstonecraft should 
also be squealing at Burke, who makes some piggish digs at women and education: “a 
woman is but an animal, and an animal not of the highest order” (95). Pigs also remind 
Wordsworth of man‟s Promethean thoughts and dullness, while for Coleridge, pigs are a 
reminder of “the waywardness of words and associations” (Bentley 26). The pig, here, is 
an emblem of Rousseau, of dreams of transcendence and of shit, and of difference in 
language. Consider also how Blake ties the signature to the pig, and Wollstonecraft ties 
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the pig to Rousseau, and Derrida and Kamuf tie the signature to Rousseau. It is all 
(hog)tied together.  
 
Furthermore, there is the possibility that the rope of Blake‟s signing hog is not a rope at 
all, but a trail of excrement; a line of argument which could only further ground the 
relationship between writing, the signature, the body, and death.  
 
To forage further into the matter at hand, inspired by Katherine Young‟s “brief discursus 
on sausages, and on feces, intestines, pigs, food, and phalluses” (111), which briefly 
traces the pig (and pork products) in Bakhtinian thought, I am certain to make my own 
trope on tripe – and I may as well since 2007 is the Year of the Pig (!) 
 
First, to understand the status of the pig we have to recognize its unique status as food 
and feces. Young calls the pig an ambivalent animal, one who is “between categories, 
wild and tame, country and city, animal and man […] It is the animal that eats feces and 
makes food” (112). It is this categorical liminality that makes the pig such an 
abomination. James Aho suggests that  
[p]igs are an abomination, Douglas argues, not because they were known at the 
time they were outlawed to harbor parasites, nor because pork spoiled in hot 
climates before refrigeration was invented. Instead their uncleanliness arises from 
their being cloven-hoofed quadrupeds that do not chew cuds. (16) 
Regardless of the exact origin, or the initial reason behind why we see pigs as dirty, the 
uncleanliness of pigs has to do with their iconic image, which is at once both in the pen 
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and in the pan. The transgression has less to do with hygiene, and more to do with the 
way in which it is in between categories.  
 
Young enlists Bakhtin to help blend the shit with the sausage. Feces, as Bakhtin explains 
in Rabelais and His World, is an “intermediate between earth and body” (175). This “gay 
matter” (335) comes from a gray matter, the intestines. As Young notes,  
Consider, then, intestines, that thin, tough, translucent tube which contains feces 
within the belly. Consider this same tubing, taken from the pig and stuffed with 
finely minced offal from the pig‟s belly. (111) 
Pig, then, is both feces and food, death and life. The winding intestines, encasing feces 
and then food, are both inside and outside bodies, reminding me here of Blake‟s 
scrawling signature, and Becker‟s description of humans as “mobile digestive systems 
[…] frantically gobbling up other living beings and leaving behind trails of fuming 
excrement” (qtd. in Aho 1-2).  
 
The Beckerean vision of humans as mobile digestive systems offers another perspective 
to Blake‟s work which is typically thought of as womb imagery. In The Four Zoas “the 
Daughters of Enitharmon weave the ovarium & the integument / In soft silk drawn from 
their own bowels in lascivious delight” (376). The reference to bowels, though usually 
interpreted as the womb, offers an alternative reading, one that sees this as an intestinal 
spinning, excremental weaving. Connolly also notes the intestinal imagery in Blake‟s 
engravings: “Another anatomical feature Blake employs is the intestine. Clouds, worms, 
and chains of human bodies are portrayed in intestinal shapes” (48). Of course, Blake 
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recognizes his own proximity to excremental origins through his writing in the satiric 
verse “When Klopstock”: “If Blake could do this when he rose up from shite / What 
might he not do if he sat down to write” (31-2).  
 
If Blake equates the signature with the hog, we might equate Blake with the spider. To 
stretch the many different hands of Blake (different from the many different Blakes), we 
can see how Blake with a hand in many mediums is analogous to a multi-limb creature; 
the spider. I choose the spider, specifically, since it brings together both the 
mechanization (Luddite problem) and Blake‟s frequent imagery of the web, loom, and 
weaver. Hilton traces this spider-work throughout Blake‟s texts, overlooking the event 
and context that complement it: the revolt of the Luddites and Byron‟s speech about it. 
“Spider work,” as Byron details, is the weaver‟s name for the shoddy work produced by 
the mechanized frames: “Yet it is to be observed, that the work thus executed was inferior 
in quality; not marketable at home, and merely hurried over with a view to exportation. It 
was called, in the cant of the trade, by the name of „Spider Work‟” (885). First calling 
Blake a pig, and now a spider – this playful tracing complements Blake‟s own play with 
textuality, the play that Blake consciously engages in between the textual and the textile. 
As Hilton notes, “[r]eferences to „weaving‟ and its enabling technology of the „loom‟, 
however, do occur with considerable frequency in Blake, usage whose significance 
comes in the etymological derivation of „text‟ from Latin texere, „to weave‟” (“Play” 85). 
The play between writing and weaving, between text and textile not only converges in the 
figure of the spider, but also in the figure of Blake‟s signature – and the many figures 
(many Blakes) it suggests exist. As Hilton, citing Essick, notes:  
 
 49 
A „Blake‟ who reports that he „has died Several times Since‟ his birth hints at the 
existence of multiple identities, and, in any event, is only „actually existing in this 
world now in the various, recalcitrant, and material body of manufactured objects 
he had a role in producing. (86) 
The evocation of “multiple identities” is further augmented by Jason Snart, who, in a 
study of Blake‟s marginalia, suggests a “more general concern that may emerge as study 
of the marginalia continues is whether documents signed by „William Blake‟ are indeed 
by the poet, painter, and engraver, William Blake” (170). Snart cites the nonspecific 
signature, “WB,” appended to the Milton volume as troubling, and also quotes G.E. 
Bentley who in “A Collection of Prosaic William Blakes” admits that “during the poet‟s 
lifetime, from 1757 to 1827, London seems to have been teeming with men named 
William Blake” (qtd. in Snart 170).  
 
Most interesting to the relationship between multiple identities and the signature, 
however, is Snart‟s examination of a letter by a William Blake:  
[It] is a letter written by „William Blake,‟ though not William Blake, the poet and 
engraver. The script itself is unlike the poet Blake‟s, though the autograph is 
enough like Blake‟s that, taken alone, it might be confused for the poet‟s. (170)  
Here, then, the complex nature of the signature becomes apparent, as do the difficulties in 
criticism. Snart admits, however, the impossibility of conducting handwriting analysis as 
a means of determining „the‟ canonical William Blake: “Blake worked in a diverse array 
of contexts, each perhaps eliciting a different hand” (170). While this may be a sufficient 
explanation, another explanation comes from the basic tenets of signature theory; that the 
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signature is always, in a sense, torn from the name and the signer, involved in a 
relationship with “a different hand.” Now, aware of the multiple William Blakes (“will 
the real William Blake please stand up?”), the name William Blake, and the signature 
attached, becomes the site and sign of a problem – just as it does with Rousseau. While 
Snart gives the most recent analysis of Blake‟s marginalia, he surprisingly fails to 
mention Blake‟s signature in Upcott‟s album, or Blake‟s copy of A Political and Satirical 
History of the Years 1756 and 1757, which has on its title-page multiple signatures of a 


















CHAPTER 5: Urizen: Fi(b)re in the (w)hole!  
 
To interrupt my interruption of Kamuf, another overlooked sense of “weaver” is the Air 
Force slang: “A pilot (or aircraft) pursuing a devious course” (OED). This is the sense in 
which I am here a weaver. Scholasta-Kamikaze! 
 
Hisao Ishizuka, in an essay entitled “Enlightening the Fibre-Woven Body: William Blake 
and Eighteenth-Century Fibre Medicine,” uses the fibre instead of the nerve to explain 
the proliferation of “fibre-based bodies” (72) within William Blake‟s poetry. Ishizuka‟s 
analysis of both textual and visual instances of entwined bodies, figures with threads, 
roots, tendrils, webs, and chains, is brilliantly spun, all the while simultaneously tracing 
the fibre throughout Enlightenment medicine. To steel a little of Ishizuka‟s 
thunder…while Ishizuka nearly exhausts the etymology of „fibre‟ in terms of its relation 
and occurrences within botanical and medical discourses, there is still one sense that is 
overlooked; the sense that most concretely connects it to Blake‟s metalwork: 
 
“fibre, n.,4.c.” A structure characteristic of wrought metal in which there is a directional 
alignment or elongation of crystals or inclusions. (OED)   
 
I refer to both concrete and steelwork within the same sentence. The two are not so 




not only an upright stone slab, bearing an inscription or design, serving as a 
monument or marker, but also the central cylinder or cylinders of vascular and 
related tissue in the stem, root, leaf, and so on of higher plants. (Applied 
Grammatology 19) 
This, then, bridges the stitch and the stone.  
 
Just as Blake reveals the embodiment of fibre in his images and texts, I would add that 
the entire text/plate, even Blake‟s entire oeuvre itself is also the embodiment of fibre. In 
this way then, fibre is not only inextricable from the fabric on a frame, from the weavers, 
from our understanding of the human body (as Ishizuka reveals fibre-theory to be one 
way in which we understood physical embodiment) the paper used for printing, but it is 
also inextricable from the chemical structure of metal; the framework of the Luddites as 
well as copper metal plates of Blake. The fibre stitches everything up.  
 
Fibre also lets everything go. Fibre not only is involved in the body‟s composition, but 
also in its decomposition and excremental condition. Fibre invokes excremental 
product(ion)s, which are located in the buttock. Aho explains that “[a]mong the most 
telling organs in the anatomy of the lived-body are its entry and exit points, its orifices” 
(2). Aho refers to James Brain and Ernest Becker, who reduce our feelings of dread to 
one single factor, death. As Aho notes, 
[o]ut of terror of their own mortality, human beings devise legends about body 
openings and invent ceremonies to police their display and effusions. […] Tears 
are farthest from death, hence the least revolting and the least subject to 
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regulation. Next in rank come hair, nails, and sweat, followed by spit, nasal 
discharge, and vomit. Urine and scat are nearest to death. (7) 
Aho limits himself to the religio-historical context of orifice-anxiety, and as Connolly 
notes, overlooks other bodily fluids: blood, mucous, semen, and milk – those which are 
feminine and/or sexual (Personal Correspondence). Still, despite these oversights, Aho‟s 
fundamental premise that we are bodies rather than simply have bodies, and that we 
move through our worlds “carnally” is applicable to any context.   
 
It is the orifice of the anus, and its corresponding anxiety that I will focus on for the 
remainder of this section, specifically focusing on Blake‟s The Book of Urizen. Just as 
Aho says about our humanness, “[w]e move through our worlds carnally, through 
handshakes, smiles, couplings, and sleep; tactically adorning, perfuming, and veiling 
certain body parts” (1), we might say the same about Blakean criticism. A quick survey 
determines the overwhelming number of critics discussing the flowers, vegetation, and 
organicism; or, the other extreme, critics are content to disconnect from the physicality of 
Blake by enframing him in sterile hypertext databases. Either the abject is missing from 
the body, thereby missing the human, or the body is missing, victim of the database 
transformed into a file extension, JPEG, GIF – a kind of Krokerian data trash.  
 
Save Connolly‟s William Blake and the Body there appears to be a general desire in 
Blakean scholarship to apply flowery perfume to the dirty parts (dirty plates), or, look 
through the body rather than actually at it – the body in the sense of how the body as 
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Blake presents it, and the body of Blake, as is in his corpus of writing. The dirty 
parts/plates I refer to here are in Urizen.  
 
William Blake is a great place to start talking about being confronted with the signature 
and the finite body: numerous plates in Milton and The Book of Urizen visually place 
buttocks, or buttocks-shaped stones, in the center of the plate, bringing together the 
reader‟s eyes and the anus; the orifice that so uncomfortably signals our finitude.  
 
In a strange little chapter of Literal Imagination, consisting of only nine pages, Nelson 
Hilton cautiously, briefly, enters and withdraws from the grave. Here, Hilton pauses on 
Blake‟s figurations of the grave in The Book of Urizen and Milton. Like a good 
deconstructionist, Hilton cites the etymology of the word “grave,” and unearths that 
“[t]he history of „grave‟ manifests unconscious associations by which engraving may be 
perceived as digging and burying as much as sculpting” (19). Barbara Stafford goes 
further, revealing the connection “between the etching process and the exploration of 
hidden physical or material topographies. Important, too, was the entire panoply of 
probing instruments, chemicals, heat and smoke, revealing and concealing grounds” (70).  
These probing instruments involved in the engraving process amplify the sexuality 
inherent in the relationship between Blake, his engraved bodies, and even his reading 
bodies. 
 
Having done a little digging of my own, it should be noted that Hilton chooses the two 
meatiest books of Blake that have the most prominent and bulging buttocks. Although 
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Hilton‟s chapter is only nine pages, these are arguably the most interesting of the entire 
book, taking a sexual reading deep. Hilton‟s premise, like that of the critics he cites, is 
that the grave figures sexually, metaphorically, for the vagina. Hilton notes, “[t]he 
engraved line is hollow until filled with the body of ink […] The hollowness of the grave 
is also that of the womb, waiting to be filled” (22). The equation of the grave with the 
vagina is not convincing, and Hilton leaves textual traces that suggest we have good 
reason not to believe what he says.  
 
Hilton argues that “Milton similarly opens with its protagonist entering the dark ground” 
(23). Although this “dark ground” may be a tomb, womb, cave or grave, as Hilton 
suggests, I argue that this “dark ground” may also be a rectum. This reading, confronts – 
and is confronted by – Milton‟s tight buttocks; in fact, it is at the very center of the plate 
– just like the center of The Book of Urizen. Visually and critically, then, we are forced 
to face it. And so, after having faced the butt, how can we say this reading speaks of the 
vagina? Clearly, if anything, the “literal imagination” of Blake is the literal crack in the 
image, the buttocks. To do so would be to speak of the reader‟s (selective) blindness. 
 
Hilton isn‟t the only one to gloss over the buttocks; Thomas Vogler and Molly Anne 
Rothenberg only address – more like dress up – the butt crack as a metaphor for this or 
that. This seems to be a pervasive fear of the perverse: of being sucked into the crack, of 
coming near the dirty orifice (in all the senses), of critical contamination (no „serious‟ 




Vogler, in “Re:Naming MIL/TON,” opens with an image of the title page to Milton with 
the image of Milton‟s backside. And while the essay addresses the “/” cleft in the title, 
Vogler overlooks the obvious graphically similar “/” cleft of Milton‟s butt crack. And, as 
Vogler breaks down the different meanings and connotations of the words “breach,” 
“chasm,” and “cracks” (153), he astonishingly manages to look the other way and miss 
their connection to the literal “crack” on Milton‟s body. If Vogler‟s essay is about the 
crack, about the breach, it should be noted that Vogler actually manages to avoid 
breaching the crack; he has in effect, not taken the text as far, as deep, as it should have 
gone. 
 
Nonetheless, the overlooked buttocks motif is most disappointing in Rothenberg, whose 
book, Rethinking Blake‟s Textuality, is supposed to be a „rethinking‟ of Unnam‟d Forms; 
it fails to push the figures of depth deep enough. It is in her chapter entitled 
“Epistemological Crisis and the Phenomenalistic Subject” where Rothenberg has the 
most potential for getting into the crack in the way she examines the depth and shadows 
of Blake‟s figures. While Rothenberg examines Jerusalem, her analysis of the figure on 
Plate 97 could easy be of any of Blake‟s muscular figures. Examining lunar crescents and 
optic rays, Rothenberg‟s reading into this crack is “if the figure could be viewed in its 
bow configuration, the odd lines marking the left back and buttock of the figure might 
stand out as a female head and torso” (94). Interestingly, then, the buttocks are never 
critically examined as themselves, always as something else – or as Rothenberg reveals 
by making out a woman‟s head and torso, even someone else entirely. As Connolly 
suggests, Rothenberg would rather make the female an arse than face the arse, going to 
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unlikely lengths to make it heterosexual, all to avoid Blake‟s butt fascination (Personal 
Communication).   
 
Perhaps the most ambiguous butt belongs to the one with a similarly ambiguous name: 
Urizen. Of Urizen‟s rock-hard buttocks, Hilton sees “a double headstone […] the graven 
tablets of the law” (25). To Hilton‟s credit, he does admit that “Urizen and his reader are 
equally caught in his grave condition” (25). Recognizing this mutual implication echoes 
Connolly who suggests that Blake‟s books “having something to do with getting through 
to an unreceptive audience […] are more likely to swallow up their readers” (2). 
Connolly‟s invocation of being “swallowed” speaks eloquently to the permeable body 
boundaries, as well as to the permeability between the grave/rectum, reader/rectum. 
Being “swallowed” is clearly erotically charged, and complements Hilton‟s consideration 




Hilton‟s reading reveals a fear of the orifice, which is a surprising phobia for a Blakean, 
since as Connolly notes, “Blake‟s books are preoccupied with the orifices of the body” 
(3-4). Furthermore, Connolly finds Blake‟s books themselves to be orifices that (threaten 
to) suck the reader in, also suggesting that Blake “likens entering his text to entering a 
human body” (4). Connolly, perhaps coyly, doesn‟t specify, or limit herself by doing so, 
specifically which orifices are involved. Connolly notes that “Blake‟s books are the 
opposite of Ezekiel‟s scroll: they are more likely to swallow up their readers” (2). 
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Interestingly, if Blake‟s images swallow their readers it isn‟t the mouth doing the 
swallowing; oftentimes the buttocks are presented at eye-level (where the face should be) 
– for example, Urizen‟s body appears upside-down, Milton‟s butt is in the middle of the 
title page – leaving the anus to do the swallowing; here, the anus is the vortex.   
 
Hilton avoids swallowing (t)his, revealing himself to be a conservative reader, and this 
investigation into the cleft and crack of Milton ultimately untouched. Connolly warns that 
“[a] reader unwilling to fill in the blanks, to participate, to take that risk of emotional 
investment in the text, may be frustrated and repulsed by the demands and the dangers 
imposed by the orifices of the illuminated books” (12). It is even more than simply the 
risk of an emotional investment; it is also the risk of performing a queer reading which 
admits one‟s contemplation of queer sex acts, producing a text that might threaten to 
contaminate the grounds of other texts. What Hilton tries in vain to avoid is the orifice, 
and yet to deal with any of Blake‟s texts is always already to be dealing with the orifice. 
Blake, then, is orificial. We should embrace the orifice, swallowing Blake as he swallows 
us.  
 
Connolly identifies skin as an orifice that is enterable, a point that plays out nicely with 
my desire to enter the surface/skin/orifice of theory:  
the skin, and surfaces like that of the text, are really orifices by which to enter. 
Not only Blake‟s works, then, but also the bodies they depict, are meant to be 
entered; their insides are meant to be visible, not made impenetrable by layers of 
skin. (32)  
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Just as the textual bodies‟ skins which Connolly reads are meant to be entered, so are the 
words of Hilton. Hilton prattles on about the etymology and related senses of the word 
vortex, vorare, etc., revealing this methodology of etymology to be a penetrating, de-
skinning of sorts; deconstructively treating words as orifices that are meant to be entered, 
their inner connections made visible.  
 
However, after tracing the Latinate root of vorare, “to devour,” Hilton single-mindedly 
sets out to make a case for the vagina as the vortex. Hilton cites numerous associations 
where the vortex is “a translation of „female‟ […] a psychoanalytic interpretation of the 
vortex as the vagina” (206), even referring to Burke‟s anxiety over the “vortex” of the 
French Revolution. It is this reference to the French Revolution that is the clincher, or 
should I say the sphincter.   
 
The French Revolution – this reference, if nothing else, draws an indexical line between 
the vortex and the anus rather than between the vortex and vagina. Consider here the 
popular references, rhetoric of the Revolution, which are primarily scatological. As 
Claude Gandelman in his essay “„Patri-arse‟: Revolution as Anality in the Scatological 
Caricatures of the Reformation and the French Revolution” notes: “the scatological 
imagery is, indeed, an upside-down structure inside an upside-down structure” (15). 
There was the presentation of “the King as „father arse.‟ This last manipulation was 




You cannot speak of vortex, fibre, and the French Revolution all in the same breath and 
not invoke the anus. Hilton says “„Vortex,‟ like „fibre,‟ shows itself as a somewhat 
indeterminate word, though evoking great power and energy” (206); ignoring the anus 
but admitting the word is indeterminate… open, then, already to a queering, new anal 
direction: not limited to the vaginal reading he and others perform. By drawing attention 
to the butt, Blake is explicitly queered.  
 
Furthermore, since Hilton describes the vortex as having “great power and energy,” and 
also mentions Burke, it appears that a closer examination of Burke‟s writings on the 
French Revolution, particularly in terms of his description of gender, reveals the male 
gender of having great power and energy (via the rousing Revolutionaries. He also 
laments the very loss of this great power via the lack of chivalry). Burke also displays 
anxiety over his innards: “We are not the converts of Rousseau […] In England we have 
not yet been completely emboweled of our natural entrails” (106-7). Burke reveals here 
how he sees the Revolution as being powerful enough to penetrate one‟s entrails. And so 
again, Hilton equates the vortex with great energy and also admits to Burke‟s 
characterization of the French Revolution as a vortex. Through Burke‟s charge of male 
sexuality/prowess as this great power and energy, we can align the vortex more along the 
lines of the male (w)hole rather than female one.  
 
Strangely enough, Hilton admits that vortex is a “somewhat indeterminate word,” but he 
manages to overlook the parallel way in which vaginal veil – invoking here the hymen – 
is also an indeterminate word. Hilton‟s reference to the vagina as veil provides here an 
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opportunity to slip through the loophole. As Lucy notes, “[t]he hymen as the veil or tissue 
in general (and not exclusively a membrane belonging only to women) occupies a sort of 
„non-space‟ between an inside and an outside” (49). Even more explicitly, Derrida notes 
that hymen also stands for the “filmy membrane enveloping certain bodily organs; for 
example, says Aristotle, the heart or the intestines” (Dissemination 213). The hymen‟s 
link with the intestines is overlooked.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that Hilton explicitly compares vortex with fibre leaves me to point 
out how the hymen too interweaves many senses, such as “membrane,” “tissue,” 
“textile,” “fabrics” “canvases” and “spider web” (213). Thus, if the hymen can be 
conceptually torn from the property/propriety of the female, then certainly so can the 
even more “indeterminate” word, “vortex” – it just requires tearing Hilton a new one, or 
at least tearing his reading away from this text. I think Hilton ignores the anal vortex here 
because he has been sucked into it; perhaps ass first, leaving him looking at the only 
thing in sight, the vagina.  
 
It is back again in that grave chapter, where in a surprising, most confessional turn, 
Hilton somewhat out of place admits that “[w]e all know the desire not to know, to 
misread, or, having read, to forget” (27). Does this sentence from Hilton redeem the 
repressed anal reading? Is this an admission of a deliberately denied reading? Of resisting 
a reading that would so erotically swallow its readers? Of keeping out of Blakean body 






Behind Urizen‟s head on the illuminated title page to the Book of Urizen is a 
gravesite/grave-sight. The image has been interpreted as upright stones, a sideways letter 
B; commandment tablets; tombstones, even castle architecture. Undoubtedly it is many 
things to many people. Paul Mann alone, in his essay “The Book of Urizen,” sees the 
looming shape behind Urizen as “wings” (50), “tombstones” (51), “doors of a stony 
cavern” (51), and an “entrance to the book” (51). Adding to the divergence of readings, I 
offer this jejune one: an incredibly bulbous buttock raised high into the air. All these 
possible readings of the buttocks complement the multitude of possible ways in which to 
read Urizen‟s name. One critic, Hazard Adams, playfully cycles through many bawdily 
interpretations of Urizen: “You Risen,” “Your reason,” “Urine,” “Uranus,” and “Your 
Anus” (439). 
 
Another issue that arises as a result of the buttocks is the limitation of the William Blake 
Archive. Although this extensive database allows for a “buttocks” field, the search results 
are limited to plates from Jerusalem, Europe, and America. In all actuality there are far 
more mentions of the buttocks in Blake‟s work – many more obvious examples even 
beyond the title page of Urizen. Then, there is the more general disappointment of its 
hypertext structure, which aggravates the butt‟s literal disembodiment or 
disembowelment in the way that it is only a butt if the Archive tags it as one. The 




This dirty reading certainly opens wide the interpretation of the entire title page, evoking 
on a larger scale a view from/of the anus/rectum: the trees with their fibrous limbs are 
inked brown and help to evoke the insides of the rectum. We are inside the rectum then. 
As visitors, we gawk. We see the tears and scars. What Sherry sees as “double columns” 
(140) in an “environment of stone” (141), I see as “double cheeks” in an “environment of 
sex and shit.” This is to see Urizen as “horror-zone,” Mann‟s clever interpretation of the 
ambiguity surrounding the pronunciation of Urizen‟s name (“The Book of Urizen” 50). 
As uncomfortable as this reading may feel, it isn‟t without grounding. Peter Otto ploughs 
the way for anal readings of Blake in Europe, and many critics have rightfully interpreted 
the title page of Urizen as overwhelmingly evoking the grave. Simon Watney and Leo 
Bersani, using the backdrop of AIDS, bring us full circle, examining the grave in its 




We can see Urizen‟s own relation to the through the figure of the hog. Like the hog, 
Urizen occupies an ambivalent position between categories, such as life/death, 
food/feces. Bakhtin‟s notion of the carnivalesque is a good framework to apply to Urizen, 
particularly considering its inverted structure and the inverted placement of Urizen‟s 
buttocks. As Young notes, “[t]he carnivalesque move is to turn upside down or inside 
out, to invert or reverse” (113). More specifically, however, Urizen‟s body language 
allows him to be read as Bakhtin‟s clown: “This is manifested in other movements of the 
clown: the buttocks persistently trying to take the place of the head and the head of the 
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buttocks” (Bakhtin 353). Such a reversal degrades the body and the mouth. Loosely, the 
clown connects back to another freakish member of the carnival, the precocious pig:  
To degrade is to bury, to sow, and to kill simultaneously …, to concern oneself 
with the lower stratum of the body, the life of the belly and the reproductive 
organs; it therefore relates to acts of defecation and copulation, conception, 
pregnancy and birth. (Bakhtin 21) 
The pig is a metaphor for the rectum. Watney, in Policing Desire, from whom Bersani 
simply borrows the title of his essay, explores the connection between the grave and the 
rectum more fully and physically than Bersani, grounding himself in the AIDS discourse, 
making the body and the writings about it meet on the physical body, in an orifice. With 
Watney, the metaphor of grave/rectum is fully fleshed out. Still, both Watney and Bersani 
– particularly in Homos – are capable and comfortable doing dirty work; in speaking 
candidly about the policed nature of the male rectum.   
 
Watney writes, “[t]hat the male rectum is the most thoroughly policed part of the male 
anatomy suggests that a particular effort is needed to redirect the libido away from deeply 
repressed memories of anal erotic pleasure in infancy” (126). Watney certainly touches a 
nerve in terms of all that seems to be repressed in Blake studies. So far, until now, amidst 
all the Blakean criticism, a rectal reading of the title page of Urizen has been repressed.  
 
To help dig out and into this repressed rectum, and uncover another instance of how 
everything fits together, we might touch (on) Genet. In Funeral Rites, Genet describing a 
rim job touches upon some of the same imagery I have been evoking here: 
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Then I tried hard to do as good a job as a drill. As the workman in the quarry 
leans on his machine that jolts him amidst splinters of mica and sparks from his 
drill, a merciless sun beats down on the back of his neck, and a sudden dizziness 
blurs everything and sets out the usual palm trees and springs of a mirage, in like 
manner a dizziness shook my prick harder, my tongue grew soft, forgetting to dig 
harder, my head sank deeper into the damp hairs, and I saw the eye of Gabes [the 
anus] become adorned with flowers, with foliage, become a cool bower which I 
crawled to and entered with my entire body, to sleep on the moss there, in the 
shade, to die there. (253)  
The stone imagery here only heightens the comparison between stones and butts. There is 
another sense, a more political sense in which the stone touches the anus; the gravestone 
and AIDS. As Watney notes, “Aids offers a new sign for the symbolic machinery of 
repression, making the rectum a grave” (126). More important is the surprising similarity 
in description (sparks, sun) between Genet and Blake‟s Urizen; the level of detail also 
complements the intricate sketching of buttocks and anuses in Blake‟s Notebook (16).   
 
The fact that the „stone‟ on the title page of Urizen appears to be a blank slate nicely 
complements the text‟s virginity; it not having been previously sexed up. However, what 
cannot be ignored is the dirt of the scene. The brown inking at the top of the plate invokes 
the rectal walls. As Bersani notes, “[t]here is, to be sure, a reversal of given terms here: 
the anus produces life, waste is fecund, from death new landscapes emerge. But perhaps 
such reversals could take place only after the entire field of resignifying potentialities has 
been devastated” (Homos 179). Perhaps this is why a fertile anal reading is only coming 
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now (or it isn‟t even here yet); coming only after seemingly every possible angle and 
interpretation has been given on Urizen; after it has been exhausted.  
 
Putting the ASS back in the GrASS 
 
As Bersani explains, the 
solution to the problem of revolutionary beginnings condemned to repeat old 
orders: he dies so that repetition itself may become an initiating act. This can be 
accomplished only if dying is conceived, and experienced, as jouissance. The 
fertility of rimming depends on its being immediately productive. The 
hallucinatory excitement induced in Genet by his foraging tongue gives birth at 
once to the luxuriant bouquets and bowers of his writing. (Homos 179) 
Bersani‟s description of the relationship between flowers and fucking offers a new 
approach to Blake‟s writing. This is interesting because it allows for a discussion of 
virility without reproduction; it taints the flowers as sexual recreation rather than 
necessary procreation.  
 
Stitch meets Gitch: Puckered Anus 
 
My „shitty‟ reading, following Genet, betrays what Bersani calls “the ethic of 
seriousness” that “governs our usual relation to art, inviting us to view literature, for 
example, not as epistemological and moral monuments but, possibly, as cultural 
droppings” (Homos 180-1). To return from the sow to the sew, from the rectum back to 
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the thread at hand, I pass through the anus. But(t) even the anus looks like it has been 
gathered tight, a butchered sewing job, pulled hard, puckered. But I will let this line go 
now… 
 
I follow Bersani who says, “In a society where oppression is structural, constitutive of 
sociality itself, only what society throws off – its mistakes or its pariahs – can serve the 
future” (180). Picking up Bersani‟s thought, I am here working with both the thrown off 
line of thinking that criticism has ignored, and the thrown off line. Speaking of blurring 
lines and images, scrawling sexualities and signature, both coalesce in the signature of 
William Blake. In constant negotiation with the frame, Blake also ties up the relation of 
the framing line, with the signature and its physical embodiment. Sherry‟s essay, “The 
„Predicament‟ of the Autograph: „William Blake,‟” gives an excellent reading of William 
Blake‟s autograph/signature as appended specifically to his friend‟s album. It appears that 
the line is part of the youth‟s body, making a completed circuit by either entering or 
exiting from the hands and knee. As Sherry notes,  
The signature may be an epitaph, on the one hand, a downward displacement into 
absence and death traced by the downward movement of its framing line, or this 
same line may be the shroud just thrown off by the resurrected body of the youth 
who leaps upward like the figure of the resurrected Christ in the frontispiece to 
Night Thoughts. (151)  
Here we see both the line (as shroud) thrown off the figure, but also the line is thrown off 
(discarded) for the sake of Sherry‟s excited possibility of developing a resurrection 
figure. The line itself, then, has thrown Sherry off. I do not believe the figure is a gesture 
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at the resurrected Christ, or any immortal angel for that matter (no wings). The more 
appropriate likeness of the figure is simply a human, a fleshy, finite being. While this 
reading is not nearly as glamorous, or archetypal (or even „literary‟), seeing the figure as 
a finite human is both a) more appropriate to the context of the finite signature and b) 
realistic: since as humans we have been likened to defecating angels. Sherry tries to set 
up the circuit as follows: the body may be held down by the text, or the body may be 
freed from this text. The actuality is that neither body nor text can be read as being 
„immortal,‟ freed from the bounds of the grave, of death. In fact, tethering the text to the 
body, literally drawing a line between the signature and the body only doubly reinforces 
the finitude of each. 
 
If we consider the orgasm to be “le petit mort,” we might rather read the reference to who 
“has died several times since” as a colloquial description of one who “has orgasmed 
several times since.” To draw this out even further, we could break the line breaks and 
read the writing as continuous (following the flowing line of the figure): “who has died 
several times since January 16, 1826.”  In order to read this way, the eye must move from 
the right of the page to the left, helplessly following the flowing line weaving around the 
text belonging to the figure. This traversing, or rather perversing of the line brings our 
gaze across the genitals of the figure, pausing there for a moment to wonder where, if 
anywhere at all, the genitals are. Blake‟s specific placement of the line – having admitted 
it was not the result of chance, and thus not an autograph: “my own […] in some measure 
Works of Art & not of Nature or Chance” (Erdman Complete 698) – supports this 
perversing of the line. Still, Blake‟s ambiguous understanding of what exactly his own 
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illustrated inscription is keeps the possibility open for this to be art, “which a Man Does 
with his Thought & Mind” (698), or autograph, “Writ helter skelter like a hog upon a 
rope” (698).   
 
If we might read the line in the instance of Blake‟s signature figure, what is there to say 
that we don‟t manipulate every possible theoretical approach/framework in approaching 
the lines belonging to the signature alone?  
 
Snart suggests we refrain from using handwriting analysis to determine “the” William 
Blake: 
There is of course the danger that if such autographic issues begin to dominate 
approaches to Blake‟s annotations, there will inevitably be attempts to create a 
system to identify Blake‟s handwriting. However, handwriting analyses are 
inexact endeavors at best. (170) 
However, I find Snart‟s phrase “inexact endeavors” strange. Is not all criticism, all 
communication for that matter, only ever “inexact endeavors”? All handwriting, all 
literary analysis – are these all not inexact endeavors? If this is its charge, its 
characteristic, then I find handwriting analysis as valid as the rest of our critical 
endeavors. Furthermore, Snart‟s imagined system that identifies Blake‟s handwriting 
already exists; the Blake Archive, functioning as a database, has already identified 
Blake‟s handwriting, through the process of selection and collection. Ultimately, Snart‟s 
understanding of and argument against using handwriting analysis is weak, his fears 
already realized and rendered obsolete. 
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Still, such “inexact endeavors” might further complicate the picture, and it is in hopes of 
such “inexact endeavors” that we still find Blake and begin again. I argue for the use 
handwriting analysis not as a means of coming to some reductive objective meaning, but 
as a means of contributing to an excess of methodologies, procedures, critical 
perspectives: of reading and writing the signature not just grammatologically but 
graphologically as well.  
 
Snart‟s understanding of handwriting analysis misses the point: it clearly cannot mean to 
come to any solid inherent truth, and I do not believe it even pretends to do so. Even 
Snart himself acknowledges Blake‟s range of styles:  
Blake worked in a diverse array of contexts, each perhaps eliciting a different 
hand. He worked sometimes on his own designs, sometimes as an engraver for 
hire, sometimes on manuscript drafts […] sometimes composing directly on the 
copper plate. (170)  
Snart is correct in recognizing that an artist as diverse as Blake given his interest in 
continual change and experimentation might use multiple signature styles. Thus, given 
Blake‟s own multitudinous styles and signatures, handwriting analysis as an “inexact 








CHAPTER 6: Derriere - Derrida 
 
Graphological analysis is another form of a close reading; grammatology for words and 
images. It is the reading of a letter/character and tracing its picto-etymology within the 
text(s), between texts. As Samantha Matthews suggests in a footnote,  
Modern handwriting analysis has considerable scientific and legal credibility, and 
is routinely used in forensics and human resources. […] The reading relies 
heavily on biographical facts; objective analysis is impossible where the 
handwriting and signature are immediately recognizable. (240)  
What about applying this to Derrida‟s own signature? Using the idea that there is nothing 
outside the text, along with the signature‟s own ambiguous position as inside/outside the 
text, we are justified in „reading‟ the signature as text and thus performing, with all 
means possible, an analytical breakdown: not even the signature, nothing about the 
signature, is excluded from this reading.  
 
Furthermore, since we are never coming to any sort of objective, definitive conclusion or 
argument, what harm is there in using an approach that is fundamentally unable to be 
objective… does this not make it all the more fitting? We are able, then, to perform more 
than a grammatological reading; we can extend its reach to include a graphological 
reading. 
 
As a sort of introduction to Derrida‟s „own‟ signature, we should return again to an 
example from the nineteenth-century. Matthews, in “Reading the „Sign-Manual‟: Dickens 
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and Signature,” identifies the period‟s “obsession with handwriting and autograph” in 
relation to Charles Dickens‟ own “ambivalent” relationship with his signature. While 
ambivalent is not the most apt characterization of Dickens‟ treatment of his signature 
(given his exchange of signature for money), Matthews‟ analysis of the two “influential 
and co-dependent cultural movements: a fashion for collecting autographs, and 
graphology, the pseudo-scientific analysis of character traits from handwriting,” helps 
complicate the presentation of the signature (232).   
 
While only one sentence explicitly refers to Derrida, in the initial description of the 
signature, Matthews‟ selective quotations from Dickens‟ Little Dorrit reveal the text‟s 
excellent ability in being a precursor to Derridean signature theory. The Circumlocation 
Office‟s operates on a system of “checking and counter-checking, signing, and counter-
signing” (Dickens qtd. in Matthews 238).  
 
Then, there is the mysterious traveler whose signature is described as “in a small, 
complicated hand, ending with a long lean flourish, not unlike a lasso thrown at all the 
rest of the names” (Dickens qtd. in Matthews 239). According to Matthews, 
graphologically “a „small, complicated hand‟ denotes a secretive and scheming character, 
while the menacing „lasso‟ flourish reveals the writer‟s dark designs” (239). 
Unfortunately, there is no further speculation on this scrawl – perhaps revealing 
Matthews‟ own ambivalent relationship with the signature. Curiously enough, this 
“mysterious lone guest” who adds his name to the guest list at the Swiss convent in Little 
Dorrit has slipped between the scholastic crack; a crack that might be explained by 
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Kamuf: “the undecidable trait of the signature must fall into the crack of the 
historicist/formalist opposition organizing most discourses about literature” (Signature 
13). If the signature is inescapably related to a crack, we might also recall then the crack 
of Blake, as discussed earlier: the vortex/butt crack he places directly in the face of the 
reader – this technique too; a sort of “signature style.”  
 
Just as Vladmir Nabokov says that “cosmic” is always at risk of losing its “s,” I say that 
the “scholastic” is always at risk of gaining an “s” – scholas”s”tic. It is here where we 
might slip behind the (butt) crack – derriere the derriere – and find Derrida and his 
“menacing lasso.”    
 
“Menacing” breaks down into “men/acing”, evoking male Aces, pilots; bringing us back 
to an earlier sense of the term “weaving”: Air Force slang for pilots pursuing a dangerous 
course. I bring this up as a way into Derek Liddington‟s art installation entitled Top Gun, 
which brings together Derrida‟s own signature carved into the vinyl record soundtrack to 
the film Top Gun. Although this grammatological reading is not how Liddington 
describes his project (he describes Derrida simply as a Top Gun amongst theorists), Top 
Gun perfectly incorporates the men/acing quality of the signature. Connolly notes that it 
is a fitting mixture of a discarded theoretical figure and a defunct medium. Still, I wonder 
if Space Cowboys might not have been a more fitting soundtrack to carve Derrida‟s 




“Lasso, n.” A long rope of untanned hide, from 10 to 30 yards in length, having at the end 
a noose to catch cattle and wild horses (OED). 
 
Derrida‟s signature, as it appears at the end of his essay “Signature Event Context,” 




As you can see, Derrida‟s “J,” for Jacques, appears easily/clearly as a lasso figure. The 
lasso itself also connotatively ties together the “rope” and “hog”; and appears here, 
finally, as a means of recklessly rounding up the threads of wild lines that weave 
complexly through fibres, frames, figures and handiwork of the Romantic and 
postmodern periods.  
 
And maybe my round‟em‟up methodology is hog-wash. 
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“Hog-wash, n.” Inferior writings of any kind (OED). 
 
Tracing the signature, following the movement of the lasso, involves tracing backwards, 
backwards to the period where the existing body of signature theory grounded itself in 
Rousseau. This is not to let Rousseau out of the hog-tie, but to swing Jacques at others: to 
expand and complicate the number of signature, contexts and events that deconstruction 
misguidedly believes it has caught. Using my theoretical lasso, “J” (Derrida‟s signature), 
which is a currently underexamined figure in critical theory, I have expanded what is 
meant by the signature, having extended the understanding of line work; I have also 
given a better context for the signature, an expanded, richer foundation by focusing on 
many rather than just Rousseau, as well as offered some concrete historical events – in 
hopes of further complicating and developing the stain of the signature, in general, as 









stands as a 
monstrous 
prophecy                                                                                                    
of our 
postmodernity 
   
- Hassan 93 
According to Ihab Hassan, “the creative act is always crooked” (93). This crooked 
jinglish janglage prophesizes more than just our postmodernity; it uncannily speaks of a 
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new “J”, the one who continues this jocular writing, Jacques Derrida. The Joycean 
jinglish janglage describes Derrida‟s signature, the crooked appearance of the first letter, 
“J”. As Hassan talks about Joyce, we now talk about Derrida. To paraphrase Hassan 
talking about Joyce, to talk about Derrida: We are all Jacqueans, crypto-Jacqueans, meta-
Jacqueans, para-Jacqueans. We have seen the second coming of the J-man (no, not Jesus 
but Joyce, and then Jacques). His “J” is a heavy ark, a rainbow, a lasso…  
 
The creative act is also crooked in the sense of being outlawed, a threat. As Derrida, on 
the subject of threats to the university, suggests: 
Certain members of the university can play a part there, irritating the insides of 
the teaching body like parasites. […] Now, the possibility of such parasiting 
appears wherever there is language, which is also to say a public domain, 
publication, publicity. To wish to control parasiting, if not to exclude it, is to 
misunderstand, at a certain point, the structure of speech acts. (Eyes of the 
University 95)  










Part II: Begin Again  
 
While Kamuf‟s “weaver/ruler” figure theoretically helps to conflate the two separate 
spheres, public and private, of the eighteenth century, or even to emasculate the 
traditional figure of the dominant, masculine orator/public figure, the figure also 
disregards two defining perspectives and histories that complicate the figure, class and 
gender.   
 
Perhaps it is painfully obvious, the connection between weaving and writing, so much so 
that I believe we can see their relation as being more concrete than simply metaphorical. 
Yet, to yoke weaving with ruling, on the basis of “assembling and separating” elements 
(Signature 44), as Kamuf pushes us to do, at least in the political ruminations on the term 
„ruling,‟ is to employ a meaningless metaphor, a figure, which is ironically devoid of any 
political import, in so far as the demographic (female) it evokes yet excludes.  We come 
to such a strained (ineffective) figure only through the vaguest, most archaic 
etymological sense of the word „contract.‟ More appropriate (and perhaps obvious) would 
be to consider the immuno-biological sense of „contract‟ (as in disease), and the related 




Kamuf throughout her etymological breakdowns of „contract‟ appears to choose archaic 
senses of the word at the cost of the physiological, immunological sense of the word 
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„contract.‟ Ironically, the result of this is that her title „Contracting the Signature‟ now 
functions as the name „Rousseau‟ did earlier for her; as the name of a problem, “the 
problem of the idealist exclusion of writing- of materiality, of exteriority – in the name of 
the subject‟s presence to itself” (24), although now in terms of body boundaries.  
 
“contract, v., 5.a.” To enter into, bring upon oneself […] incur, catch, acquire, become 
infected with something noxious, as disease, mischief, bad habits or condition; danger, 
risk, blame, guilt (OED). 
 
Disregarding the biological/physiological sense of the word is particularly surprising 
considering the environment surrounding Signature Pieces; published in 1988, the same 
time that there was “an urgent need for [dialectical] engagement” according to James 
Miller, concerning the period of representation of the AIDS crisis; the same year that 
MIT Press, reprinted a legendary issue of the New York theory journal October (winter 
1987), under the name AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism, which infamously 
gave voice to radical activism and cultural commentary. Furthermore, 1984 saw the death 
of Foucault from AIDS. As Miller notes, the rhetoric coming from a multitude of sources, 
awareness campaigns, drug companies, media coverage, and, I would add, critical theory, 
during the late 1980s, concerned subjects and styles that were leaky, sweaty, messy, and 
contaminated. 
 
While critics and cultural theorists such as Watney, in 1987-8, expose the media‟s 
diseased rhetoric in their AIDS commentary, or put together anthologies on AIDS 
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criticism (Miller 6), Kamuf is speaking their language, employing their rhetorical tools 
without getting her hands dirty, sanitizing the language of the AIDS discourse/disease, 
without any dis-ease, without truly dealing with the „contract.‟ While this may present 
itself as the perfect opportunity to charge theory with the usual litany of offenses – that it 
is out of touch with reality, useless, or even just dead, it is also an opportunity to defend it 
by citing a number of theories that are messy and half-aborted, which because of these 
characteristics nevertheless survive, and function in a way that blurs the line between 
simply being an abstract idea and a living/dying figure.  
 
Kamuf following Derrida devotes most of her time to discussing the signature in terms of 
a contract, in the sense of a promise – i.e. a legal contract. Contract yes, in terms of a 
promise, but also contract in terms of bodily cont(r)act. While Kamuf, like every other 
critic describing Derridean signature theory, is correct in describing the legal signature, 
she, not unlike many deconstructionists, also overlooks the physiological sense of the 
word implicit in „contract‟ and the signature. And, for those who do discuss the body, or 
at least acknowledge its presence and value to the signature, the immunological/bacterial 
sense of „contract‟ remains critically untouched.  
 
Capitalizing the „S‟ on „Signature‟ is simply a part of adhering to publishing convention 
in formatting, presentation, etc., general typography, and also the convention of naming 
of diseases (for the name of the disease to be capitalized). Here, then, I am essentially 
suggesting that we are dealing with a proper name, that which is not dissimilar to a 
signature. Unknowingly, Kamuf‟s choice of a title (“Contracting the Signature”) becomes 
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itself a case in point, encased even, in the ambiguous space, or difference among the 
signature, the proper name, and disease; putting under erasure even those categories that 
some critics consider to be separate entities. Putting the two together is akin to making 
the parts touch.    
 
For Kamuf to word it “Contracting the Signature,” capitalizing the „S‟ on signature, she 
invokes the sense of disease, although she fails to touch upon it; perhaps a criticism 
indicative of contemporary criticism itself. 
 
I, however, will touch upon it. In fact, I will go beyond touching. I will make that 















CHAPTER 7: Body Contract 
 
I am having Derrida‟s signature tattooed on my body as a means of embodying, or 
contextualizing, aspects of this thesis. As Kamuf says, “[t]o quote a text is always to cut 
into it and interrupt its flow” (Book of Addresses 208). There are other implications of 
this act that speak to the current critical practices within the Humanities: writing on the 
body as a new place of critical space; a return from space to place, and comments on the 
loss of space; of encasement within the university (being asked to give up my office 
space; academic/artist becomes a sleeper cell). It is an act of violence; cutting into the 
“property” of Derrida, of the university and Archives Canada (via thesis regulations 
which limit the thesis to existing only as a computer file), and of my body.    
 
This act of inking and cutting is only fitting in that the signature itself cuts across time, 
surviving, import (promise) intact, beyond the body to which it belongs. It does so by 
necessarily being readable and repeatable. For, as Derrida notes, 
In order to function, that is, in order to be legible, a signature must have a 
repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to detach itself from the present 
and singular intention of its production. It is its sameness which, by altering its 
identity and its singularity, divides the seal [sceau]. (“Signature” 328)  
It is through this necessary sameness and difference that the inherent 
contradiction/paradox within the signature becomes evident. As Derrida explains, “the 
condition of possibility for these effects is simultaneously, once again, the condition of 
their impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous purity” (328). The very condition 
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of the signature necessitates this paradox; revealing the signature itself to be a 
theoretically contaminated figure; a complex figure, the pharmakon – both cure and 
contaminant.  
 
Iterating such “apocalyptic rhetoric” as my postmodern predecessors irritates O‟Gorman, 
yet is both necessary and appropriate. Identifying the signature as contamination and as 
pharmakon helps to tether this cornerstone of signature theory to something grounded and 
corporeal, the body, an otherwise strangely unfashionable figure in Derridean signature 
theory. And so, while the signature in the sense of property and law is easily understood 
as contractual, the physical sense in which the signature is contractual is mysteriously 
omitted.  
 
One critic, Sarah Wood, connects the signature‟s repeatability, or iterability, with 
irritability, a bodily state: “Irritability is also about nerves and muscles: “Physiol. and 
biol. the capacity of being excited to vital action (e.g. motion, contraction, nervous 
impulse, etc.) by the application of an external stimulus” [OED]” (17). Complementing 
Wood‟s discussion of iterability as irritability is Lucy‟s coffee example used to explain 
iterability:  
First thing every morning I make myself a cup of coffee; in fact I make several 
cups. Each coffee is singular, unique, unlike the others (the second cup is not the 
first and so on), but each one is also an instance of the same, the general, the 
others that it resembles and to which it belongs. This is not a feature peculiar to 
coffee; it‟s a condition of the singularity of a thing – any thing – that the thing in 
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itself belongs to a general form of such things which that particular thing 
represents. Everything is always therefore a trace, a text, an example of writing 
[…] The important point to notice here is that repetition is never pure; it always 
leads to alteration. (59) 
Even though Lucy doesn‟t explicitly connect iterability with irritability, as Wood does, 
his example begs for this pairing! Lucy is right about the coffee; each cup brings about a 
change. Most obviously, in the case of coffee, iterability (many cups of coffee) is 
connected to irritability – although I can from experience say that the absence of 
iterability is also linked to irritability! 
 
Inadvertently suggested in Wood‟s commentary on irritability/iterability and what goes 
otherwise critically untouched is how the signature is contractual in terms of the 
physiological, muscular contractions involved in the signing of the signature. It is this 
bodily sense of the signature as (muscularly) contractual that warrants more attention and 
provides yet another way in which vaporous signature theory can ground itself. Perhaps, 
by talking about the signature without talking about the body‟s contractions, we can infer 
that this is proof of a phantom signer? A ghost in the machine? Proof, undoubtedly, of a 
ghost in the theory – (in the theory machine?).  
 
Iterability + Irritability After (Reading) Derrida 
 
We might continue the commentary on iterability and irritability, particularly as they 
meet in Derrida himself. With Derrida we are always already left having to repeat 
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ourselves, others, in such a manner that leaves us irritable. So, there is the way in which 
Derrida is also the name of a problem, the new Rousseau whose signature is Jacqued off 
onto all of us. The wild disseminating “J,” the lasso of his signature has (always already) 
hogtied us all.  
 
And yet, there is the insularity of deconstructive thinking as we undeniably continue to 
feed off of Derrida. Writing about Derrida explicitly demands the signature and the 
irritability that results from reading his labyrinthine writing. Sarah Wood‟s review of 
Nicholas Royle‟s After Derrida, and Robert Smith‟s Derrida and Autobiography reveals 
the difficulties in writing about Derrida. Just as X marks the spot of the signature, Sarah 
Wood explains, “[t]his „practice of writing after Derrida‟ would be „a theory of ex-
citation,‟ concerned with both „iterability‟ – and irritability” (Royle qtd. in Wood 17). 
 
I argue that this writing Royle, Wood, Kamuf, and Bennington speak of is a writing more 
of extra-citation than ex-citation. It is impossible not to say more, especially within the 
discourse surrounding Derrida, of Derrida. Trying to write about Derrida is different than 
writing with Derrida, as do Bennington in “Derridabase” and Kamuf in Book of 
Addresses. Gregory Ulmer, too, stresses the importance of writing with theory rather than 
about it, in his most lucid example of this, Applied Grammatology. Note the self-
referentiality of my point: I cannot even begin (again) to write about Derrida without first 




I would argue that contemporary critics need to roll up their sleeves and admit that the 
stain (theory of stain, stain of theory?) is still there – as is the urge to stain; in the sense 
of a call to arms, as well as anagrammatically speaking, the signature. We need to 
engage, ingest, the leaky, staining, messy, chaotic, entropic way of thinking! This 
demands engaging the messy body with the chaotic theory of deconstruction. Some 
critics, such as Lee Quinby, engage the sticky signature through „pissed criticism.‟ 
Nowhere else is it easier to see this parasitical relationship forming than in the art world, 




Asides from writing with Derrida, what about writing on him, as in, on the subject of 
Derrida, or, more literally, on Derrida?  
 
O‟Gorman, multimedia performance artist/cultural theorist, and self-proclaimed ex-
Derridean scholar, forces a physical relationship with Derrida. His art installation, 
Derridraw, involves growing seeds through drilled holes in Chora L, which lies split 
open, cover to cover, in a planter box. Such are O‟Gorman‟s efforts of working through 
Derrida, or more poignantly, grounding Derrida.  
 
While in some sense O‟Gorman‟s reaction appears to be natural, there is also the sense 
that this effort to „ground‟ Derrida is reminiscent of a body dump, an amateur murder, a 
violent reaction to what so many express, that is, frustration with poststructuralism? It is 
 
 86 
after all, only half-buried. Or, considering O‟Gorman‟s French farming background, 
perhaps this is a modest burial, a transplanting, translation (back?) to French soil. Or, 
even a testament to the fertility of Derrida‟s writing. 
 
Still, only the front and back covers are used, arguably suggesting that Derrida, the bulk 
of poststructural theory, has yet again, slipped through O‟Gorman‟s fingers. Now, to 
really get under the nails of O‟Gorman, much to his annoyance, I postulate that 
Derridraw gesticulates more to the immortality, the eternal naissance of Derrida‟s 
writing, rather than its death. If O‟Gorman returns us to dirt, we are already on ripe 
archetypal terrain for biblical imagery. It is not a stretch then to see Jesus‟ resurrection 
from the tomb, leaving behind only the clothing, as analogous to the French Father 




This „call to arms‟ I spoke of earlier, to (re)employ the messy theories and embody them 
in the messy body, will have its own embodiment in the form of a tattoo on my body.  
 
The signature demands the body, and more importantly, the body‟s finitude. It is this 
finite body that almost always slips through the cracks in talking about the signature. 
Still, there is a trace. As Kamuf says, “My signature is a ghostly trace of my absence, a 
reminder not only of the limits on „mes forces‟ or „ma vue‟ but of the finitude that is 




There needs to be risk again in theory. Risk encountered, confronted, ingested, invited 
into the human body, but with the greatest risk of all; remaining human, choosing to 
remain and embrace a finite, fleshy, body.  
 
Is it possible for me – here, anymore? – to get my hands dirty with words? Submitted, 
regulated, formulated/formatted electronically, I have not so much as a paper cut from 
this project. Certainly compared to other writing technologies, such as dip pens or 
printing presses, where it is impossible not to get dirty hands, I am left here, sanitized. 
The only relief comes from CNN, which informs me that harmful micro bacteria live in-
between the computer keys, a concept I won‟t develop here, but that literally embodies 
Burroughs‟ word-as-virus theory, of the poststructural sense of word as parasitical. 
 
Coupled with this move towards an untouchable uploaded space is the loss of physical 
space, or place. Given the hugely increased number of grad students to the department 
(more students than office space), it may be safe to say that there is no more room in the 
graveyard! The fact that the English department has been likened to a graveyard is 
exacerbated by the fact that the English department just built three new closets next to my 
office and you know what people hide in closets – skeletons!  
 




If not dirty, then at least bloody; after all, anagrammatically speaking, words = sword. I 
am left to dig into the body now at the point of my tattoo, a means of bringing the 
academic space INSIDE the body. My body will become the site of work space –playing 




I am going to try to write of and from an untenable, even painful 
place: the point of sharpest contact with certain texts of Jacques 
Derrida‟s, at the tip of the pointed instrument of a writing, there 
where a common language and remnants of an idiom cut into each 
other and words split apart. – Peggy Kamuf Book of Addresses 199 
 
 
Derrida cuts into our theoretical psyche, a relationship that cuts, stabs, stings. Derrida 
cuts – his name, his signature, his remains. Kamuf asks,  
What is it in literature in particular or at its edges that cuts, or perhaps that stabs 
like a sword or stings like a syringe with „a sharpened point‟? […] Why is it that 
the literal mark of literature is blood, a bleeding passion that is quickly cooled by 
the drying ink, which is the cut‟s strange survival? (Book 199) 
The answer to Kamuf‟s question of what it is that “stabs like a sword” is words – 
Derrida‟s sword anagrammatically rearranged is words.  
 
Tattooing Derrida‟s signature is a means of literalizing that mark which marks theory, of 
physically embodying the mark along the edge of his texts, the signature, to show that the 
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edge does cut. Engaging the physicality of Derrida‟s signature involves cutting, stabbing 
and stinging. It is taking risk. It marks the body, as well as the signature.  
 
This tattoo embodies the possibility and practice of counterfeiting, in the sense that the 
one who signs Derrida‟s signature is not Derrida himself. Also, there is another 
phenomenon at work in my project that isn‟t directly touched upon by Derrida: the notion 
that in counterfeiting the signature there could be a multiplicity of signers/counterfeiters. 
In this instance, I have contaminated the notion that the signature is the mark of one 
signer; here, the tattooed signature exists as the multilayered-tracings of Professors Stan 
Fogel and Tristanne Connolly, myself, and the tattooist. I will bear the mark of their 
hands on my body, collected and emptied under the name Jacques Derrida. The many 
have contaminated the possibility and presentation of the one. They have all signed 
signatures that weren‟t theirs; signatures that do not correspond to their proper names. 
Ultimately, then, this signing has contaminated their signatures. It is a reminder of 
Derrida‟s absence, of his finitude – and inscribed on mine, rather than on an immortal 
surface, it reinforces its and my own finitude. Derrida is groundable, albeit with some 
violence. 
 
Is this an act of frustration? A cutting edge example of parasuicide? An act of 
necrophilia? Or a revealing of what is always already beneath the skin (?), as British 
tattooist Chinchilla symbolically describes her practice: “I only open up the skin and let it 
out” (qtd. in Fleming 63). Still, regardless of what it is or isn‟t, and perhaps in order to 
justify the relevance, or literariness,  of this tattoo thesis to my “literary studies,” what 
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must be remembered is that as the mark of literature (or as that which marks my marking 
of literature) il faut que ca saigne – it has to bleed. As Kamuf notes, “the passion of 
literature is associated with the passion of love, with the alliance of two beings of flesh 
and blood” (Book 200). After all, saigner and signer; to bleed and to sign, is, as Kamuf 
notes, “the slim difference of a letter” (210). While all this does smack of marriage, 
which is another sort of blood contract, we are not both in love. But, perversely I might 
be in love with him, a corpse; this might be a performance or event of 
necrosexuality/necrotextuality; Derridead. Clearly, here, I have been seduced by the 
Name-of-the-Father-of-Theory. Derridead = Ed (my father‟s name) + Derrida.  
 
Kamuf notes, “[s]o as not to get mixed up in the mechanics of literary confession, one 
dreams while writing of causing to disappear the instrument that receives the blood in 
small specimens, but not at a small price” (211). Derrida is mistaken if he thinks the 
syringe is the answer: “I always dream of a pen that would be a syringe, a suction point 
rather than that very hard weapon with which one must inscribe, incise, choose, 
calculate…once the right vein has been found, no more toil” (“Circumfession” 10-12).  
The syringe is also capable of being a weapon, committing and inflicting great violence 
and pain. Still, the closest we come to a disembodied writing is with the computer, which 
removes the sharp edges, stylus and paper, where you might cut yourself. (It should be 
noted however, that the effects of writing at the computer can be quite painful – to speak 
of my own sciatic nerve.) Still, the desire for a writing to come naturally from the body, 
ultimately is a writing without touching, one that is void of passion and removes the 
possibility to literally bleed.  
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I am not the first to hook Derrida (nor even claim to have hooked him in the best spot). 
My treatment of Derrida‟s signature builds off of Valerio Adami‟s treatment of it. 
Derrida indicates his point of interest in “the angular signature of Adami […] I yielded, 
even before knowing it, as if I were read in advance, written before writing, prescribed, 
seized, trapped, hooked” (“+R” 156). Kamuf notes that: “There is all the same an arrow, 
a pointed tip, a very small spot in Adami‟s drawing that Derrida does not pick up […] 
Indicated with a tiny trait, the barb of the hook extends beyond the muzzle of the fish” 
(Book 215). And, there is all the same a “J” that Kamuf does not pick up: that this „barb 
of the hook‟ is the initial “J” – and yet another manifestation of the menacing lasso of 
Jacques Derrida.  
 
So, while I am not the first or only one to hook Derrida, I will do it with a literal syringe. 
According to Kamuf, “[t]he worst kind of contamination thus circulates in this element of 
needle/pen exchange” (212). Without ever actually naming it, it appears that Kamuf is 
referring to the tattoo, where both needle/blood and pen/ink meet. Arguably, what makes 
this kind of mingling so atrocious is the way in which it requires literal bodies to mix 
with theoretical bodies. Atrociousness aside, it is almost uncanny that my project 
involves tattooing the barbed “J” that pierces the fish in Adami‟s painting, since, as 
DeMello points out, tattoo “[n]eedles get sharper over time, rather than duller, due to 
their constant friction inside the needle tube. They often curl over into a fish hook shape 
from too much use as well” (201, my emphasis). As Margrit Shildrick, who examines the 
monstrous postmodern body, puts it: “I have no hesitation in moving between material 
and abstract registers” (108). 
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My project recognizes similarities with the Irigarayan concept of corporeality, which 
Shildrick identifies as a positive perspective of corporeality: “positive precisely insofar as 
it is mediated by touch, by mucus, and by the mingling of blood” (113). It is through this 
economy of touch, rather than detached gaze that we see Irigaray‟s sense of the body as a 
“sensuous engagement both with the other and with the world” (113). Shildrick‟s 
description of Irigaray‟s engagement as sensuous helps to tease out the erotics of the skin, 
of the site – rather than sight – of touch; for example, when Irigaray says, “[t]he internal 
and external horizon of my skin interpenetrating with yours wears away their edges, their 
limits, their solidity. Creating another space – outside my framework. An opening of 
openness” (qtd. in Shildrick 119). The particular location of the tattoo amplifies this 
opening. 
 
Finally, and what I find most poignant in what Shildrick has to say about Irigaray is how 
she reveals “an acceptance of bodyliness in all its forms” (119). From bodyliness we are 
implicitly connected to bodylines; the line between them, quite clear. Bodyliness and 
bodylines have frequently, then, throughout this thesis, merged, overlapped, become 
inseparably interwoven, and, of course, draw closest to me in my tattoo.  
 
Bodylines(s) and Bodylines 
 
These two concepts literally merge in the tattoo, particularly in the tradition of what 
bodies wore tattoo designs. There was a literal connection between defined bodyliness 
and bodylines, as in the inky lines drawn on the body.  
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Margo DeMello, in Bodies of Inscription, offers a socio-historical account of the tattoo in 
America. DeMello cites Ed Hardy, infamous tattoo guru, who notes that “often the 
earliest „homemade‟ tattoo efforts with sewing needle and India Ink … express the 
initials or name of the wearer” (65). According to DeMello, the “simplest form of the 
literal tattoo is the word tattoo, and the most basic form of the word tattoo is the name 
tattoo” (65). DeMello explains that “the most literal tattoo was the identification tattoo. 
Servicemen, for example, often had their names, service number, rank, and date of birth 
tattooed on them” (65). And, even outside the military, similar practices of identity 
marking were occurring. As Chuck Eldridge notes, as a result of the Lindbergh baby 
kidnapping in 1932, and the first issuing of the Social Security card in 1936, a large 
number of men, women and children were getting tattooed (qtd. in DeMello 65). They 
were, in effect, having their identity, an identity, tattooed on them. Most interestingly, 
even the government was interested in this practice of bodyliness/bodylines, evident 
when in 1955, “the assistant secretary of defense suggested that all U.S. citizens have 
their blood type tattooed onto their bodies in anticipation of a military attack on the 
United States, and many citizens evidently complied” (Eldridge qtd. in DeMello 66).  
 
DeMello refers to these people with tattoos as the „wearers‟ of the tattoos. She repeatedly 
talks about the “wearer” of the tattoo (138), reminding me of how wearer is like weaver. 
Just as it doesn‟t take much to see the connection between bodyliness and bodylines, it 
doesn‟t take much to see the connection between wearer and weaver, especially 
considering Hardy‟s description of the earliest tattoos being done with ink and the sewing 
needle. Furthermore, the connection between wearer and weaver in terms of tattooing is 
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closer than with clothing, as the tattoo is woven into the body fabric – neither wearing off 
nor wearing out.  
 
This conflation of tattoo wearer and weaver is clearest in Paul Mann‟s Masocriticism, 
wherein one section links the tattoo both with “stupid Rousseauism” (177) and with the 
T-shirt. Mann notes, “[t]he tattoo, like the T-shirt, transforms the body into another agora, 
a corporeal mini-mall, but for what we might call fuzzy capital” (179). He says that the 
tattoo indicates “like just about everything else proposed as an exercise of difference, it 
too links the individual with the „economy of signs‟ in his or her most intimate 
dimensions” (179). For Mann, the tattoo isn‟t simply one or the other, radical or capital, 
and for that ambiguity he calls it fuzzy: “Fuzzy capital is an economy that is neither 
simply capital nor effectively subversive, neither recuperated nor liberated, but the 
collapse of any dialectical tension between them” (180). Here, Mann sharply articulates 
the complex economy at work in/under the tattoo: “The tattoo makes the skin a zone in 
which capital thrives under the aegis of its subversion and mutates even as it survives” 
(180). It is interesting to note that it was suggested to me by O‟Gorman that I make a 
Derridean signature clothing line rather than have it tattooed on my body. For O‟Gorman 
the tattoo smacks of too much “hero worship,” but as the fuzzy Mann reveals, the T-shirt 
participates in the same fuzzy economy. So, it seems far more perverse to bring 
capitalism underneath the skin that is more intimate than what a T-shirt touches. I am 
able, via its location on my body, specifically my “most intimate dimensions,” to really 




Conclusions: Getting Off (Of) Derrida 
 
As I near the end of this writing, my thoughts turn to the way in which this is still far 
from over. I now understand Derrida clearest when he says, “[t]he whole does nothing 
but begin” (“Law” 219). In the way that its completion will only be its beginning, it will 
end only on paper, continuing on the skin that will be cut off from this (writing). And, 
since the signature requires a countersignature, in effect, this thesis will not be closed, the 
signature not having yet been countersigned.  
 
Sometime after I have written here about signing the text, I will have finally signed it. I, 
here, then, write avant mes lettres. I will sign shortly hereafter, although it will have 
appeared long before this. The signature complicates temporality, and I am telling you 
now, a before which will come after, of its betrayal.  
 
I will have signed a contract with the University that I am the author of this text. I will 
sign it once I have met the requirements concerning structure and format. My signature 
will establish this thesis‟ completion only in effect of the countersignatures of my reader, 
supervisor, and Graduate Office. It is only a signature, after all, as Bennington notes, “on 
condition that it call or promise a countersignature” (157). And although my signature is 
“no more than a promise of a countersignature” (157), there is no place within this text 
for such a countersigning. I have made the promise, here, to contract the signature… and 




As such, any appearance of closure, of completion, offered up by the signature, the mark 
of the law, is an illusion. This text is not closed; I have not kept all my promises. Yet.  
Despite all these measures put in place of signing and countersigning, as a means of 
lawfully governing the text, there is the way in which my text still escapes. I have slipped 
through the loophole – the loophole itself as figure of the signature – in that I have yet to 
be tattooed.  
 
Here, in this thesis, I have made a contract to have Derrida‟s signature tattooed on me. I 
have even appended my own signature, made the mark of a mark to mark the event of 
marking. And yet, it, all these marks, will mean nothing until/unless it is signed, or more 
aptly countersigned – signed by the other, the tattooist. As Bennington notes, “we always 
remain indebted to the first signature […] But by the same token, this first signature 
remains in our debt too, depending on our response to that call” (165). 
 
So, while I will have signed this document, attesting to the completion of it, there is a 
sense in which it will still escape the law; having not kept all my promises. Within the 
bounds it still goes unbound. And so, here, at a place/point where you might expect to 
have conclusions drawn, you have the possibility of conclusions drained. Have I been 
lying or pretending? After all, as Bennington notes, the signature “pretends to gather up 
all the moments of the „enunciation‟ of the text into this single moment of meta-
enunciation which closes the already written book for the writer and opens it for the 
reader” (154). The signature is a ruse in temporality, amongst other things, by being 
presented before the text, when it has come after it.  
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And so we are back again to begin again. The name of the signature is a ruse; a ruse 
sewing it all up – sounding a lot like Rousseau. We are back (again) through the ruse to 
the name of a problem, of the problem of the paradoxical signature, that name of the 
problem that promises to be associated with Rousseau.  
 
Still, I have refined and refashioned (effiné) the problem; further complicating the 
signature by implicating and complicating other names and signatures. Effiner is a play 
on my last name, Effinger. The “g” escapes the etymology here; interesting since in my 
future work the “g” will play large role. French theories seem to be (always already) the 
name of a problem, so it especially interesting to note that by cutting the „g‟ out of my 
surname changes it from German to French. This grammatically embodies to a degree the 
violence between German and French that Joan Hawkins examines in Georges Franju‟s 
film Les yeux sans visage (1959), wherein a female subject has her face scalped off. 
Hawkins uses the contentious issue of wartime French-German collaborations as a means 
of fleshing out a better context for the film‟s focus on what makes the vrai visage. 
In postwar France, as well, bad memories of the war and of patriarchal guilt were 
initially exercised by (temporarily) destroying the looks of women […] In a sense, 
French guilt over all French collaboration was initially mapped onto women‟s 
bodies, and it was women who bore the brunt of the punishment for most of the 
quotidian traffic in German commerce. […] In that sense, shaved postwar French 
women stood in for all French collaborators, and their temporary disfigurement 




While this would be an excellent context to investigate/invaginate extreme performance 
artist Orlan‟s own skin-grafting performances, it is also a way of understanding how the 
relationship between French and German has been historically literally marked on the 
skin. This is of interest to me as another opportunity for anecdotal theory. I have been 
dangerously collaborating, mixing German (descent) with French (theories). Most 
interesting is that in both a return and a reversal this collaboration will be mapped onto 
my skin via the tattooed signature; the temporary disfigurement of being „shaved‟  only 
further revealing the wider crimes of cuntextual closeness I have committed with/in the 
name of another with the hands of others.   
 
By the multiplicity of signatures, here, tracing over Derrida‟s signature, collected under 
the signature countersigned by many, the text remains “open” – a point that is nicely 
literalized by its private location. As Bennington notes, “for to make one‟s text absolutely 
proper to oneself, absolutely idiomatic, would be to bar all reading of it, even by oneself, 
and so the totally signed text, proper to its signatory, appropriated by him, would no 
longer be a text” (163). The self-reflexivity of this text contaminates all signatures 
attached to it; more to the point, it actively augments the always already contaminated 
nature of the signature.  
 
Fogel and Connolly‟s tracings of Derrida‟s signature, which are countersignatures to 
Derrida‟s, to my project, to my own, will in turn be countersigned by the tattooing and by 
me reading. It will be their signing, but not their „own‟ signatures; revealing the two-way 
directionality of contamination. Not only have they contaminated Derrida‟s by 
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counterfeit signing, but contaminated their own signature by having signed that which is 
not consistent with their own. It both is and isn‟t their signature. It is a good example of 
what Jane Marie Todd describes as “[t]he outside is brought inside, the signature placed 
in the text, the reader‟s identity blurred with the author‟s, and genre definitions 
transgressed in the process” (18). 
 
This text which will have been submitted to the department in the morning – marking the 
time of day I have always started writing this thesis – will also be a work of mourning. It 
is a work of mourning for the way in which it remembers and memorializes the other, not 
just Derrida or the signature, but Fogel and Connolly; those who have helped with the 
text are also implicated and incorporated into the text and onto my body. The tattoo 
(l)inks us together, a Barthesian souvenir: “Happy and/or tormenting remembrance of an 
object, a gesture, a scene, linked to the loved being and marked by the intrusion of the 
imperfect tense into the grammar of the lover‟s discourse” (216). Stan Persky in 
Autobiography of a Tattoo also frames his tattoo in terms of memory: 
The tattoo came not at the beginning, when most sailors get them, as a promise or 
a vow of things to come, a hopeful boast of manhood, but at the end – of my „tour 
of duty,‟ of an initiatory education in desire, art, the world – as a document, 
testimony, as a vow of memory. (205) 
Persky‟s vow of memory recalls here Bennington who writes on remembering names:  
 
we shall say that this indebtedness (let‟s call it friendship) is grounded in a 
certainty underlying any encounter, namely that one of us will die before the 
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other, will in some sense see the other die, will survive the other, and will 
therefore live in memory of the other, wearing the other‟s mourning, like it or not. 
(166) 
One debt (among the many) I owe is for that first encounter with Derrida, which seems to 
underlie any encounter I have; to the work which is now, all, in part, a part of my work; it 
will now always already be a mourning of the one in the other. And, as Bennington puts 
it, I will „wear,‟ rather than bear, the mark quite literally; the tattoo will be living in the 
memory of the other, a wearing of the other‟s mourning, and mourning of the other. The 
tattooed signature will be a trace of Derrida, Fogel and Connolly, a trace of their tracings.  
 
This textual closeness, perhaps already too uncomfortable for some academics, will only 
be further perversed by the location of the signature on my body. It might be more apt to 
call this a transgressive act of cuntextual closeness.  
 
Derrididdling; or, Getting Off (On) Derrida 
 
Continuing the punning linguistics of “derridadaism,” “derridoodling,” and “derridraw,” I 
introduce “derrididdling.”  
 
The specific placement of the tattoo is strategic to my methodology; as a veiled return to 
context, to cuntext. I am not suggesting that context should be figured as something 
absolute, determinate, but rather as a means of further complicating the (im)possibilities 
of meaning(s). While it is a place of origins, it also isn‟t; for example, as explained 
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earlier, Blake‟s buttocks and Bersani‟s reading of Genet present a redefining and a 
reversing of archetypes with figures of the fertile anus.  
 
Obviously my potty mouth prose owes a lot to Jane Gallop, who, in The Daughter‟s 
Seduction, brazenly calls Lacan a “prick” (36), a “floozie”(42); she also coins the 
impressive term “cuntamination” (84). And yet, Gallop‟s most famous contextualization 
comes in “The Liberated Woman” when she admits to having masturbated to Sade (97). 
And, to put this anecdote in context, Gallop‟s masturbation recalls the master 
masturbator, Rousseau, and like Rousseau, Gallop has, though for different reasons – 
namely French-kissing a graduate student in front of the class – become the name of a 
problem, at least from the vantage point of academe. And yet, as the 1811 Dictionary of 
the Vulgar Tongue reveals, “academy” during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
was slang for a brothel. Gallop is out of context; holding untimely orifice hours.  
 
Still, it would be more apt to see context as cuntext, remembering the cunt‟s relationship 
with fluids and erotics. The tattoo‟s erogenous placement can be traced back to Plato‟s 
Phaedrus in terms of the erotic connection between the body and writing. Peters, who 
reads the Phaedrus as a critique of media that reveals our prevalent anxiety over 
communication, suggests that “On discovering that he has the text of the speech tucked 
inside his tunic, Socrates loses interest in Phaedrus‟s version when he can have „Lysias 
himself.‟ Here, already, the written word is figured as an erotic object, concealed close to 
the body” (39). It is the location of this close relation that we might call context, and its 
location undeniably factors into the eroticizing of the written word. As such, considering 
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context‟s important role in tainting the written word (not determining it), that 
deconstruction critique can continue to sweep it aside is to reveal its own current sterile 
methodology. So, perhaps, to see it as cuntext we might be able recuntsider the ways 
context problematizes, makes messier rather than clearer. It certainly has been identified 
as the “name of a problem” by Derrida, so rather than leave it alone we should critically 
diddle it more.  
 
Juliet Fleming uses Kristeva‟s work on the abject and its liminality to frame the tattoo as 
“a boundary phenomenon”; one that is neither “inside nor outside” but “[l]odged on the 
border between inside and outside” occupying the “no-place of abjection” (64, emphasis 
mine). Fleming expands the psychic liminality of abjection, describing it as that which is 
on the border between symptom-expression and repression, making a parallel between 
the physical and psychological in terms of their location topography:  
This interim position between symptom production and sublimation is one that is 
attributed to the tattoo when it is understood as a self-inflicted wound – at once a 
mark that abjects the bearer, and an assertion of control over abjection. (64) 
Both in terms of physical and psychological manifestations of the abject, it is a border 
phenomenon. And, it is its inside/outside location that lends itself to Derrida‟s discussion 
of the hymen and invagination, as well as offers an explanation of my methodology 
throughout this entire thesis. For Derrida the hymen is a “sign of fusion” (Dissemination 
209), one on which “so many bodily metaphors are written” (213), and invagination is 
“through which the trait of the first line, the borderline, splits while remaining the same 
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and traverses yet also bounds the corpus” (“Law” 217). This text is a hymen and is made 
up of hymens – threads opened, frayed and interwoven.  
 
Bound to the invagination is the “yes, yes” of the signature in general, and a particularly 
nervy location on my body. As the signature connects, as shown earlier with Blake, with 
death and sex via le petit mort, so too does the signature connect via its “yes, yes” with 
the orgasm. Derrida admits “we must write, we must sign, we must bring about new 
events with untranslatable marks – and this is the frantic call, the distress of a signature 
that is asking for a yes from the other, the pleading injunction for a counter-signature” 
(“Ulysses Gramophone” 282-3). This frantic, pleading, asking for a yes, is an aroused 
rhetoric, revealing a critical ache. Although it is less obvious than Gallop‟s French-kiss, it 
still reveals an erotic economy whereby, as Richard Burt and Jeffrey Wallen note, “the 
legal subject (one who can give consent) is equated with the sexual subject, and also with 
the pedagogical subject (the student)” (75). This economy which links legal, sexual, and 
pedagogical together is particularly interesting to my current investigation/invagination 
of the Derridean signature – and the way in which this economy is also already operating 
within the signature itself. Lucy notes, “a signature is not reducible to a proper name, for 
Derrida; it marks something like the idiosyncratic or singular „weave‟ of a text or a 
writer‟s „style‟” (166).  
 
My own signature then will have been the signature, the weaving – sometimes recklessly, 
often erotically – within and between texts, this weaving marking my idiosyncratic 
„weave‟ of this text. I am incessantly, intimately, incestantly concerned with questions of 
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the signature, of my stain urge, which are one and the same. Burt and Wallen note that 
“A haven of theory makes it safe to get off on figures of sex” (78), to which I would add 




If our reader is now confused by our wanderings, 
she can consider herself in good company 
 –Gallop Seduction 107 
 
Now to admit what I have been doing all along…without saying too much. Much to your 
frustration (?) I haven‟t broken (m)any laws; I have been following the law of law of 
genre, “a principle of contamination, a law of impurity, a parasitical economy” (Derrida 
“Law” 206). I have mixed theories and periods, ink and blood, swapped signatures, 
abstract and literal, even waxed soft-pornographically on academic bodies otherwise off 
limits. I do not have to pick any one or any other, since as Derrida says,  
if an assured and guaranteed decision is impossible, this is because there is 
nothing more to be done than to commit oneself, to perform, to wager, to allow 
chance its chance – to make a decision that is essentially edgeless bordering 
perhaps only on madness. (218)  
By mixing rather than picking, my methodology attempts to perform this essentially 
edgeless bordering on madness through weaving in such a manner that it may be 
“impossible to decide whether an event, account, account of event or event of accounting 
took place” (218). This heuristic method is a whoreistic one. Even David Simpson 
reveals a limitation of picking one approach, even the Derridean approach, to textual 
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analysis, namely the idea that there is nothing outside of the text. For Simpson, “Derrida 
and many of his disciples seem to offer precious little in the way of incentives to move 
the analysis beyond the surface of the text, back into the historical powers that constitute 
its play” (23-4). While Simpson is on the right track here, his use of the word „constitute‟ 
is somewhat misguided. It is not that a historical context necessarily constitutes (for that 
would be too reductive, authoritative, and simplistic), but that such a context offers more 
material for play to play with; context necessarily contaminates. And, this Derridean 
desire to eliminate context from play suggests to me that it is still anxious about 
transgressive methodologies. Simpson offers an example of when an insulated textual 
analysis is not enough: 
In particular, Blake and many of his contemporaries write a language through 
which a highly sophisticated political energy may be discovered to be latent, and 
occasionally obvious. The recovery of this energy of course takes research, in the 
old-fashioned sense; it cannot be expected to emanate from a mere exercise in 
“reading the poem,” however ingenious. (24) 
I have throughout my writing, here, attempted to do both: ingenious poetic exercising and 
research. No doubt, Mann would find this not ingenious but stupid:   
The spectacle of the masocritic trying to give stupidity its due while thinking it 
through with all the proper rigor, using it to judge himself judging, to judge 
judgment itself, humiliating himself, elaborating his own discourse as the vehicle 
of a death that is anything but heroic or sublime: let us take this as the true 
spectacle of criticism. (137)  
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Certainly, I am a “masocritic,” having been told that I am embarrassing to read, and also 
in the way in which I will have made, and continue to make, excremental spectacles –
product(ions) of textual waste. The (w)hole time I have been (t)here, my writings have 
been (be)coming as Gallop‟s, “more vulgar, more vulvar” (Seduction 31). And of course, 
I am a masocritic for the way in which I will have literally made this criticism hurt by 
physically, perversely, mixing ink and blood in the tattoo. This co-mixing of fluids 
complements the co-mixing of genres and figures, as well as my often comix-ing 
treatment of subject matter. As Jeff Noonan notes, “[t]here is no essential, appropriate 
context that would distinguish proper from parasitical or metaphorical meaning” (38). 
Noonan hits the mark, but even more to the point is why context would be thought of as 
anything but these two complicating, destabilizing factors. Why wouldn‟t context, as 
thought of as a sort of loose bundle of threads/knots, appeal to a heuristic, deconstructive, 
playful methodology? As Derrida himself says, “a context is never absolutely 
determinable […] its determination is never certain or saturated” (“Signature” 310). It is 
because of its “never absolutely determinable” consistency that context – better thought 
of as cuntext for its fluidity– should play into deconstructive readings, further expanding 
the surface space for playful line work, and offering a depth of more possible factors, 
more fibres to play with – ultimately injecting figures such as the signature with more 
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